Adam's grace was not victorious delight
Thesis LXIX. As for good actions, the first man was indeed endowed with grace so that he could perform them and carry them out duly and perfectly. But that grace was not such as to make him will and act, since it was subject to his free choice and it lay with him to use it or not to use it. So the victorious delight that brings free choice under itself and moves the will to the good effectively and infallibly had no place in him.
It plainly follows that the present need of victorious delight for acting well does not arise from the nature of the will itself. Otherwise it would have had to be permanent in man, whereas in man unfallen it had no place and was not even necessary to him.
Latin
LXIX. Quod spectat autem bonas actiones, ea quidem gratia primus homo praeditus erat, ut illas exercere posset, iisque debite & perfecte fungi: sed gratia illa non erat ejusmodi, ut eum faceret velle & operari: quoniam ejus libero arbitrio subjacebat, & penes eum erat gratia ista uti, vel non uti. Ac proinde in eo locum non habebat illa delectatio victrix, quae liberum sibi subjicit arbitrium, & voluntatem ad bonum movet efficaciter & infallibiliter. Unde manifesto sequitur, illam quae jam obtinet delectationis victricis necessitatem ad bene operandum, ex ipsa voluntatis natura non oriri. Nam alioquin oporteret illam in homine perpetuam fuisse: cum tamen in homine integro locum non habuerit, nec etiam fuerit ei necessaria.