Molina: efficacy from the aid itself would destroy freedom
Thesis LXXX. On his view, an aid's being efficacious does not depend on a special motion of God which, once given, always brings free choice to consent and cooperate, and which, once withdrawn, leaves it never consenting or cooperating. Indeed he thinks those who hold this err in faith.
He reports the view of those who say that free choice's consenting or not consenting is to be ascribed to God's aid itself, or to God moving efficaciously or inefficaciously through it: so that whenever God moves through an aid that has its efficacy from the manner of the divine motion and from God himself, free choice consents and cooperates toward salvation, and whenever he moves through an aid that does not have its efficacy from him, free choice does not consent or cooperate toward salvation. Then he adds: 'I would certainly not hesitate to call this view, explained in this way, an error in faith.'
His reason is that in this way, as he sees it, freedom of choice is lost, since a person's conversion and perseverance will then depend not on his own innate freedom but on the quality of the aid and of the divine motion. 'For if,' he says, 'our choice has from the efficacy of the divine aid that it consents or does not consent to God's call, cooperates or does not cooperate toward salvation, and perseveres or does not persevere in grace, then this certainly depends not on its own innate freedom but on the quality of the aid and of the divine motion; and so there is nothing that could be credited to it for praise and merit, but rather freedom of choice toward salvation is lost altogether.' Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, question 23, articles 4-5, disputation 1, member 6.
Latin
LXXX. Ut autem auxilium sit efficax, non pendet, juxta ipsum, ex peculiari Dei motione, qua posita semper consentiat & cooperetur liberum arbitrium, remota vero nunquam consentiat aut cooperetur. Imo qui ita sentiunt, errare putat in fide. Postquam enim retulit sententiam eorum, qui dicunt ipsi auxilio Dei, sive Deo efficaciter, aut inefficaciter per illud moventi, tribuendum esse quod liberum arbitrium consentiat, aut non consentiat: ita ut quoties Deus moverit per auxilium, quod ex modo motionis divinae, atque ex Deo ipso habet quod sit efficax, liberum arbitrium consentiat, & cooperetur ad salutem; quod si moverit per auxilium, quod ab eo non habet ut sit efficax, liberum arbitrium non consentiat, nec cooperetur ad salutem: subjungit, Certe non dubitarem sententiam hanc, hoc modo explicatam, errorem in fide appellare. Ratio autem ejus est, quod ita ipsi sic perire videtur arbitrii libertas: quia, scilicet, hominis conversio & perseverantia, non ab innata & propria ejus libertate pendebit, sed a qualitate auxilii & motionis divinae. Si namque, inquit, arbitrium nostrum ab efficacia auxilii divini habet quod consentiat, aut non consentiat Deo vocanti, & cooperetur, aut non cooperetur ad salutem, perseveretque aut non perseveret in gratia, certe non ab innata & propria libertate id pendet, sed a qualitate auxilii & motionis divinae; atque adeo neque est quod illi cedat in laudem & meritum, quin potius perit omnino libertas arbitrii ad salutem. Libro de Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae Donis &c. Quaestione 23. Articulo 4. & 5. disputat. 1. membro 6.