Molina, disputation 40: prevenient grace as the Spirit's instrument
Thesis LXXXVI. This is how Molina reasons on the matter in various places, but above all in disputation 40 on question 14, article 13: 'Third, we assert that prevenient grace, by which the Holy Spirit anticipates, rouses, allures and invites an adult's choice to the acts of believing, hoping, loving and repenting just mentioned, is an instrument of the Holy Spirit, by which he further concurs efficiently and flows in together with choice itself to produce those acts, when choice consents to that grace and, with it, flows into and cooperates in those acts. Such acts therefore come at once efficiently from choice itself, through its own influence on them, and from God, who flows into them by a new influence or new action through prevenient grace as through an instrument.
'For just as the habits of the virtues, natural and supernatural alike, incline the powers to their acts and so make them apt for them, and therefore concur efficiently with the powers toward those acts by flowing into them with their own partial influence, so, since prevenient grace allures, invites and inclines the powers to elicit those supernatural acts, whenever the powers consent to rousing grace and flow into the acts to which grace allures and invites them, grace itself will also flow in and cooperate with the powers in those acts.
'Again, just as the actual existence of the habits' influence on the acts of virtue that the powers elicit depends on the powers' own influence on those acts, since a habit is not a sufficient cause for producing such acts without the powers' concurrence, so the actual existence of that new influence of prevenient grace on the acts of believing, hoping, loving and repenting depends on the cooperation and influence of our free choice on those acts through intellect and will, since prevenient grace likewise is not a sufficient cause of those acts without our choice's cooperation in them and influence on them.'
Latin
LXXXVI. Sic hac de re Philosophatur Molina variis in locis. Praesertim vero disputatione quadragesima ad articulum 13. quaestionis 14. Tertio asseveramus, inquit, praevenientem gratiam, qua arbitrium adulti a spiritu sancto praevenitur, excitatur, allicitur, ac invitatur ad praedictos credendi, sperandi, diligendi, ac poenitendi actus, esse instrumentum spiritus sancti, quo ulterius efficienter concurrit ac influit cum arbitrio ipso, ad eosdem actus producendos, quando arbitrium ipsum praedictae gratiae consentit, & cum ea influit & cooperatur eosdem actus. Quare ejusmodi actus simul sunt efficienter ab arbitrio ipso per suum in eos influxum, & a Deo qui novo influxu, novave actione per praevenientem gratiam, tanquam per instrumentum in eosdem influit. Sicut enim habitus tam naturales quam supernaturales virtutum, quia inclinant potentias ad actus, habilesque proinde ad illos eas reddunt, concurrunt cum eis efficienter ad actus, suo partiali ac proprio influxu in eos influendo: ita cum gratia praeveniens alliciat, invitet, & inclinet potentias ad supernaturales illos actus eliciendos, utique quando potentiae consentiunt gratiae excitanti, in actusque influunt, ad quos gratia allicit & invitat, ipsamet etiam gratia influet & cooperabitur cum potentiis eosdem actus. Porro sicut, quod existat in rerum natura influxus habituum ad actus virtutum, quos potentiae eliciunt, pendet ab influxu ipsarummet potentiarum ad eosdem actus; eo quod habitus sufficiens causa non sit sine potentiarum concursu ad tales actus producendos: ita quod in rerum natura existat novus ille influxus gratiae praevenientis in actus credendi, sperandi, diligendi, ac poenitendi, pendet a cooperatione & influxu liberi nostri arbitrii in eosdem actus per intellectum & voluntatem; eo quod similiter gratia praeveniens causa sufficiens non sit eorundem actuum sine nostri arbitrii in eos cooperatione ac influxu.