Molina, disputation 37: what each cause contributes to the act
Thesis LXXXVIII. He explains more precisely what grace contributes and what free choice contributes to the good acts in which a person's conversion consists in disputation 37 on the same article. There he assumes that three things concur in any good act: first, God's general concurrence as first agent; second, the particular influence of divine grace; and finally, man's free choice.
He then teaches that a good act, for example the act of believing, hoping or repenting, has from God's general concurrence that it is an act at all, but not that it is this act rather than that one; from free choice, that in its substance it is this act and not another; and from grace, that it is a supernatural act.
'For,' he says, 'it comes from God, flowing in through the general concurrence alone, as from a universal cause, and so it has from that cause no more reason to be an assent of belief or sorrow for sins than to be the opposite act or an act of some other power. From the influence of free choice, together with the knowledge and other things needed for the act to be produced in its substance, it has, as from a particular cause, that in the substance of the act it is an assent of faith or sorrow for sins rather than some other act.
'From prevenient grace, that is, from God as he flows into the same act through it, as through his instrument, together with free choice, it has that it is a supernatural act, specifically distinct from the purely natural act of believing or of sorrowing for sins that free choice would then elicit by its own strength alone, if prevenient grace did not flow in together with it.'
Latin
LXXXVIII. Quae sint vero gratiae, & liberi arbitrii partes, circa bonos illos actus, in quibus consistit hominis conversio, distinctius explicat disputatione 37. ad eundem articulum. Ubi postquam supposuit ad bonum quemlibet actum haec tria concurrere; primo concursum generalem Dei ut primi agentis; secundo particularem gratiae divinae influxum; ac denique liberum hominis arbitrium: docet actum aliquem bonum, ut, exempli gratia, actum credendi, sperandi, poenitendi, a concursu Dei generali habere ut sit actus aliquis, non tamen hic potius quam ille: a libero arbitrio ut, quoad substantiam, sit actus hic & non alius: denique a gratia ut sit actus supernaturalis. Etenim, inquit, a Deo influente per solum concursum generalem emanat ut a causa universali, a qua proinde non habet magis quod sit assensus credendi, aut dolor de peccatis, quam vel actus oppositus, vel actus cujusvis alterius potentiae. Ab influxu vero liberi arbitrii, una cum notitiis & caeteris necessariis, ut quoad substantiam actus producatur, habet tanquam a causa particulari, ut, quoad substantiam actus, sit potius assensus fidei, aut dolor de peccatis, quam aliquis alius diversus actus. A gratia vero praeveniente, seu a Deo ut per illam tanquam per suum instrumentum una cum libero arbitrio influit in eundem actum, habet ut sit actus supernaturalis, specie distinctus ab actu pure naturali credendi, aut dolendi de peccatis, quem liberum arbitrium suis solis viribus tunc eliceret, si cum eo non influeret simul gratia praeveniens.