Molina: a natural affection precedes every free act of the will
Thesis CXIV. Molina further holds that it belongs to the nature of the will, considered absolutely, that as soon as the intellect presents it with some object as good and delightful, it is moved toward that object by a certain motion and touched by an affection. That affection entices and provokes the will to embrace such an object freely. He does not think the will is ever borne freely toward any object as good unless a motion and affection of this kind, arising naturally in it, has gone before.
So when man and the angel, still unfallen, began to turn away from the true good and to prefer an earthly, private good to the spiritual and divine, in each case, on his view, the evil will was preceded by such a motion and affection. By it the man was roused and drawn to eat the forbidden fruit, and the angel to admire and look up to his own excellence.
Latin
CXIV. Praeterea Molina ad naturam voluntatis absolute consideratae pertinere existimat, ut statim atque intellectus aliquod objectum ipsi offert ut bonum & delectabile, erga illud motu quodam afficiatur, & tangatur affectu, qui voluntatem illicit & proritat, ut tale objectum libere amplectatur. Nec putat voluntatem in objectum aliquod ut bonum libere ferri, quin ejusmodi motus & affectus naturaliter exoriens in ea praecesserit. Adeoque quum homo, & Angelus integer, a vero bono declinare coepit, & terrenum ac privatum bonum spirituali & divino praeferre, in utroque malam voluntatem, juxta ipsum, antecessit ejusmodi motus & affectus, quo homo ad pomum vetitum comedendum, Angelus ad propriam excellentiam admirandam atque suspiciendam, excitabatur & alliciebatur.