But efficacy does not consist in consent
Thesis CXXIII. These writers locate efficacious grace in the very things Molina names, but they give a different account of where its efficacy lies. Molina, as shown at length earlier, has grace called efficacious on account of its result, namely that the human will works along with it. His assumptions therefore make the efficacy of grace hang simply on man's free choice, which can turn a grace that is in itself merely sufficient into an efficacious or an inefficacious one; and it follows from his principles that efficacy consists in the human will's assent and cooperation.
That conclusion is flatly rejected by the doctors whose position is being described here. They insist that the grace called efficacious is efficacious of itself, before the will consents. Properly speaking, grace is not efficacious because the will gives its consent; the will gives its consent because grace is efficacious.
Latin
CXXIII. Caeterum quanquam in rebus iisdem cum Molina ponant gratiam efficacem, eodem modo tamen non explicant in quo consistat ejus efficacia. Nam ut supra fuit fuse expositum, Molina vult gratiam efficacem dici ab eventu, quia voluntas humana ei cooperatur; adeoque secundum illius hypotheses, efficacia gratiae simpliciter pendet a libero hominis arbitrio, in cujus potestate est gratiam quae ex se sufficiens tantum est, vel efficacem, vel inefficacem reddere. Et sic consequenter viri istius principiis dicendum est gratiae efficaciam consistere in assensu & cooperatione voluntatis humanae. Hoc autem diserte negant Doctores illi quorum sententiam exponimus. Ac pertendunt gratiam quae efficax dicitur, ex se ante consensum voluntatis esse efficacem: nec si proprie loquendum sit, gratiam efficacem esse, quia voluntas consentit; sed potius ideo voluntatem consentire quia gratia efficax est.