A consequent necessity, from consent foreseen under condition
Thesis CXXXVII. They admit that in a way it is necessary for someone who has received efficacious grace to consent to it and do what it moves him to, since it is a contradiction for a grace to be efficacious and yet for the effect not to follow once it is given. But that necessity does not impair freedom, because on their teaching it is consequent, not antecedent.
For them, efficacious grace is precisely grace made up of aids so fitted to the will for the place and time that God foresaw from eternity that, if they were offered, the will would freely let itself be moved by them, though it could also resist. So the congruity that makes grace be called efficacious includes the will's future free consent, foreseen by God from eternity through conditional knowledge. Saying that a person must consent to efficacious grace therefore does no harm at all to his freedom. Only that grace is called efficacious to which the will is assumed to be about to consent freely if God applies it to the person; and so that necessity does not go before the will's consent, foreseen under a condition, but follows it.
Latin
CXXXVII. Ac quamvis, ipsis fatentibus, quodammodo necesse sit, eum qui gratiam efficacem accepit, illi consentire, & ea praestare ad quae gratia illum movet; cum repugnet gratiam aliquam esse efficacem, & ea posita effectum non sequi: necessitas tamen illa libertati non officit; quoniam ex eorum doctrina, consequens est & non antecedens. Nam ipsis ea demum gratia efficax est, quae constat iis auxiliis, quae voluntati pro loco & tempore sic accommodata sunt, ut ab aeterno praeviderit Deus fore ut iis voluntas libere moveri se sinat, si ei offerantur, quanquam etiam resistere posset; adeoque in congruitate a qua gratia dicitur efficax, includitur libere futurus voluntatis consensus, a Deo per scientiam conditionatam ab aeterno praevisus. Ac proinde nullo modo libertatem hominis laedit, si dicamus necesse esse ut efficaci gratiae consentiat, cum ea solum gratia efficax appelletur, cui supponitur voluntas libere consensura, si Deus illam erga hominem adhibeat: & sic necessitas illa non praecedat, sed sequatur praevisum sub conditione voluntatis consensum.