Objection: then imperfect works are simply bad
Thesis XVI. Someone will object: if the works of the regenerate fall short of the perfection they owe, they ought to be called simply bad, not good. An act cannot be good, or simply be called good, unless it has everything that moral goodness in an act requires, according to the saying common in the schools: 'Good comes from a cause that is whole; evil from any defect.'
To answer this difficulty, theologians point out that works which are otherwise good in their kind and in substance can show two kinds of defect. The first is when something required for an act's moral goodness is not present at all, in any degree: for example, when a work does not come from the source it should, namely faith and the love of God, or is not directed to the end it should be, namely God's glory.
The second is when everything required for moral goodness is present in the act in kind and in some degree, but not in the degree or with the perfection that the law, taken in its full rigour, demands. For example, the act comes from the right source, but a less perfect one: it does come from faith and love, but from a faith that is somewhat weak and a love lacking the fervour that the law's exacting justice (ἀκριβοδίκαιον) requires. Again, it is directed to the right end, but without the purity of intention that the law, in strict justice, demands.
Latin
XVI. At, inquiet aliquis, si Renatorum opera a perfectione debita deficiunt, simpliciter mala, non bona dicenda sunt. Nam actio bona esse, & simpliciter talis dici non potest, nisi in se habeat omnia quae ad moralem bonitatem actionis requiruntur. Juxta illud in scholis vulgatum, Bonum est ex integra causa: malum est ex quovis defectu. Ut difficultas haec solvatur Observant Theologi, in operibus, alioquin ex suo genere, & quoad substantiam bonis, duo genera defectuum notari & occurrere posse. Primum est quando aliquid ex requisitis ad bonitatem moralem actionis nullo modo, seu in nullo gradu eis inest. Ut, exempli gratia, quum opus non procedit ex debito principio, videlicet ex fide, & ex Dei amore: vel non refertur ad debitum finem, nimirum ad Dei gloriam. Alterum est quum omnia quae ad bonitatem moralem requiruntur insunt actioni secundum speciem, & in aliquo gradu, sed tamen non illo gradu, nec secundum illam perfectionem quam lex in rigore suo considerata postulat. Ut, exempli gratia, quum actio procedit ex debito principio, sed minus perfecto, id est, quum procedit quidem ex fide, & charitate, sed tamen ex fide aliquatenus infirma, & ex charitate eum fervorem non habente quem exigit legis ἀκριβοδίκαιον. Et quum refertur quidem ad debitum finem, sed tamen non cum tanta intentionis puritate quantam Lex ex rigore justitiae postulat.