Evils are not fixed in number
I do not know how, while he posits providence, at least so far as the words of this book go, he says that evils are neither more nor fewer but, as it were, fixed. In this he does away with a most excellent doctrine, that vice is without bounds and that evils are by their very definition without limit.
And from his claim that evils have been, are, and will be neither fewer nor more, it seems to follow that things stand as they do on the view of those who hold that the world is imperishable. On their view the balance of the elements comes from providence, which does not allow any one of them to gain the upper hand, so that the world may not perish. In the same way some providence, as it were, stands over the evils, which happen to be just so many, so that they become neither more nor fewer.
Celsus’s argument about evils is refuted in another way too, from the philosophers who have examined the questions of good and evil, and from history. They have shown that at first courtesans hired themselves out to any who wished, outside the city and wearing masks. Later, growing scornful, they laid the masks aside; and since the laws did not allow them to enter the cities, they stayed outside them. But as corruption grew greater day by day, they dared to enter even the cities. Chrysippus says this in his Introduction to Goods and Evils.
From this one may gather, as a case of evils becoming more and fewer, that the men called “two-way men” once stood out in public, taking both the passive and the active part and slaves to the lusts of those who came in to them, and that later the market officials drove them out. And about countless things that have come into human life from vice as it spread abroad, one may say that formerly they did not exist. The most ancient histories, at any rate, though they accuse sinners of countless things, know nothing of those who practise unspeakable vices.
Greek
Οὐκ οἶδα δὲ τίνα τρόπον πρόνοιαν τιθεὶς ὅσον ἐπὶ ταῖς λέξεσι τοῦ βιβλίου τούτου οὔτε πλείονα οὔτ᾿ ἐλάττονα ἀλλ᾿ οἱονεὶ ὡρισμένα φησὶν εἶναι τὰ κακὰ, ἀναιρῶν δόγμα κάλλιστον περὶ τοῦ ἀόριστον εἶναι τὴν κακίαν καὶ τὰ κακὰ καὶ τῷ ἰδίῳ λόγῳ ἄπειρα. καὶ ἔοικε τῷ μήτε ἥττω μήτε πλείονα κακὰ γεγονέναι ἢ εἶναι ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἀκολουθεῖν ὅτι, ὥσπερ κατὰ τοὺς ἄφθαρτον τὸν κόσμον τηροῦντας τὸ ἰσοστάσιον τῶν στοιχείων ἀπὸ τῆς προνοίας γίνεται, οὐκ ἐπιτρεπούσης πλεονεκτεῖν τὸ ἕν αὐτῶν, ἵνα μὴ ὁ κόσμος φθαρῇ· οὕτως οἱονεὶ πρόνοιά τις ἐφέστηκε τοῖς κακοῖς, τοσοῖσδε τυγχάνουσιν, ἵνα μήτε πλείονα γένηται μήτε ἥττονα. καὶ ἄλλως δ᾿ ἐλέγχεται ὁ τοῦ Κέλσου περὶ τῶν κακῶν λόγος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξετασάντων φιλοσόφων τὰ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν καὶ παραστησάντων καὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἱστορίας ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν ἔξω πόλεως καὶ προσωπεῖα περικείμεναι αἱ ἑταῖραι ἐξεμίσθουν ἑαυτὰς τοῖς βουλομένοις. εἶθ᾿ ὕστερον καταφρονήσασαι ἀπέθεντο τὰ προσωπεῖα καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν νόμων μὴ ἐπιτρεπόμεναι εἰσιέναι εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἔξω ησαν αὐτῶν, πλείονος δὲ τῆς διαστροφῆς γινομένης ὁσημέραι ἐτόλμησαν καὶ εἰς τὰς πόλεις εἰσελθεῖν. ταῦτα δὲ Χρύσιππός φησιν ἐν τῇ περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν εἰσαγωγῇ. ὅθεν ὡς τῶν κακῶν πλειόνων καὶ ἡττόνων γινομένων ἔστι λαβεῖν ὅτι οἱ καλούμενοι ἀμφίβολοι ἦσάν ποτε προεστηκότες, πάσχοντες καὶ διατιθέντες καὶ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν εἰσιόντων δουλεύοντες· ὕστερον δὲ οἱ ἀγορανόμοι τούτους ἐξῶσαν. καὶ περὶ μυρίων δ᾿ ἂν τῶν ἀπὸ κεχυμένης τῆς κακίας ἐπεισελθόντων τῷ βίῳ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι πρότερον οὐκ ἦν. αἱ γοῦν ἀρχαιόταται ἱστορίαι. καίτοι γε μυρία ὅσα κατηγοροῦσαι τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων, ἀῤῥητοποιοὺς οὐκ ἴσασι.