Against Celsus, Book IV · §81 · Origen of Alexandria

Bees and ants do not reason

Our noble friend does not see how many philosophers there are, philosophers who bring in providence and say that it makes all things for the sake of rational beings, whose useful doctrines he is doing away with, as far as he can, along with the agreement of Christians with philosophy on these points. Nor does he see how great a harm, one that hinders piety, comes from accepting that in God’s sight man differs in no way from ants or bees. He says: “If men are thought to differ from the irrational animals because they live in cities and have a constitution, offices and governments, this is nothing to the point; for so do ants and bees. Bees, at any rate, have a leader, and they have a following and service, wars and victories and the capture of the defeated, cities and even outskirts, the handing on of work in turn, and penalties against the idle and the wicked; at any rate they drive away and punish the drones.”

Here too he has not seen how what is accomplished by reason and rational thought differs from what comes about from irrational nature and mere physical make-up. For these latter, no reason dwelling within the creatures that do them is responsible, since they have none; rather, the most ancient Word, who is the Son of God and King of all that is subject to him, has made an irrational nature which, being irrational, comes to the help of those not granted reason.

Cities, then, came into being among men together with many arts and an ordering of laws. And the constitutions, offices and governments among men are either those so called in the proper sense, which are certain virtuous dispositions and activities, or those given these names in a looser sense, because they imitate the former as far as they can. For it was by looking to those that successful lawgivers established the best constitutions, offices and governments.

None of these can be found among irrational creatures, even if Celsus carries over to ants and bees the names that belong to reason and are assigned to rational beings: city, constitutions, offices and governments. For these things we must in no way commend the ants or the bees, since they do not act with reasoning. We must rather marvel at the divine nature, which has extended even to irrational creatures something like an imitation of rational beings, perhaps to put rational beings to shame: so that, looking at ants, they may become more industrious and more careful to store up what is useful to them (Proverbs 6:6–8), and, observing bees, they may obey their governments and share out the useful tasks of the commonwealth for the safety of their cities.

Greek

Οὐχ ὁρῶν δ᾿ ὁ γεννάδας, ὅσων φιλοσόφων. τὴν πρόνοιαν εἰσαγόντων καὶ διὰ τὰ λογικὰ πάντα ποιεῖν αὐτὴν λεγόντων, συναναιρεῖ τὸ ὅσον ἐφ᾿ αὑτῷ χρήσιμα δόγματα τῇ Χριστιανῶν κατὰ ταῦτα πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν συμφωνίᾳ, οὐδ᾿ ὅση βλάβη κωλυτικὴ γίνεται εὐσεβείας ἐκ τοῦ παραδέξασθαι ὅτι οὐδὲν μυρμήκων ἢ μελισσῶν διαφέρει ὁ ἄνθρωπος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, φησὶν ὅτι, εἰ διὰ τοῦθ᾿ οἱ ἄνθρωποι διαφέρειν δοκοῦσι τῶν ἀλόγων, ἐπεὶ πόλεις ᾤκησαν καὶ χρῶνται πολιτείᾳ καὶ ἀρχαῖς καὶ ἡγεμονίαις, τοῦτ᾿ οὐδὲν πρὸς ἔπος ἐστὶ, καὶ γὰρ οἱ μύρμηκες καὶ αἱ μέλισσαι. μελίσσαις γοῦν ἐστιν ἡγεμὼν, ἔστι δ᾿ ἀκολουθία τε καὶ θεραπεία καὶ πόλεμοι καὶ νῖκαι καὶ τῶν ἡττημένων αἱρέσεις καὶ πόλεις καὶ προπόλεις γε καὶ ἔργων διαδοχὴ καὶ δίκαι κατὰ τῶν ἀργῶν τε καὶ πονηρῶν· τοὺς γοῦν κηφῆνας ἀπελαύνουσί τε καὶ κολάζουσιν. οὐδ᾿ ἐν τούτοις δὲ ἑώρακε, τίνι διαφέρει τὰ ἀπὸ λόγου καὶ λογικῆς ἐπιτελούμενα τῶν ἀπ᾿ ἀλόγου φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς ψιλῆς γινομένων. ὧν τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδεὶς μὲν ἐνυπάρχων τοῖς ποιοῦσι λόγος ἀναδέχεται (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχουσιν αὐτὸν), ὁ πρεσβύτατος δὲ καὶ υἱὸς μὲν τοῦ θεοῦ πάντων δὲ τῶν ὑποκειμένων βασιλεὺς φύσιν ἄλογον πεποίηκε, βοηθοῦσαν ὡς ἄλογον τοῖς οὐκ ἀξιωθεῖσι λόγου. πόλεις οὖν παρ᾿ ἀνθρώποις μετὰ πολλῶν ὑπέστησαν τεχνῶν καὶ διατάξεως νόμων· πολιτεῖαι δὲ καὶ ἀρχαὶ καὶ ἡγεμονίαι ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἤτοι αἳ κυρίως εἰσὶν οὕτως καλούμεναι σπουδαῖαί τινες ἕξεις καὶ ἐνέργειαι. ἢ καὶ αἱ καταχρηστικώτερον οὕτως ὀνομαζόμεναι πρὸς τὴν κατὰ τὸ δυνατὸν ἐκείνων μίμησιν· ἐκείναις γὰρ ἐνορῶντες οἱ ἐπιτετευγμένως νομοθετήσαντες συνεστήσαντο τὰς ἀρίστας πολιτείας καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς ἡγεμονίας. ὧν οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἔστιν εὑρεῖν, κἂν ὁ Κέλσος τὰ λογικὰ ὀνόματα καὶ ἐπὶ λογικῶν τεταγμένα, πόλιν καὶ πολιτείας καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ ἡγεμονίας, ἀναφέρῃ καὶ ἐπὶ μύρμηκας καὶ μελίσσας, ἐφ᾿ οἷς οὐδαμῶς μὲν τοὺς μύρμηκας ἢ τὰς μελίσσας ἀποδεκτέον (οὐ γὰρ σὺν λογισμῷ ποιοῦσι), τὴν θείαν δὲ φύσιν θαυμαστέον, μέχρι τῶν ἀλόγων ἐκτείνασαν τὸ οἱονεὶ πρὸς τὰ λογικὰ μίμημα, τάχα πρὸς δυσωπίαν τῶν λογικῶν, ἵν᾿ ἐνορῶντες μύρμηξιν ἐργατικώτεροι γίνωνται καὶ ταμιευτικώτεροι τῶν ἑαυτοῖς χρησίμων, κατανοοῦντές τε μελίσσας πείθωνται μὲν ἡγεμονίαις διαιρῶνται δὲ τὰ χρήσιμα τῆς πολιτείας ἔργα πρὸς σωτηρίαν τῶν πόλεων.

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About this text

Origen answers Celsus’s scorn for the belief that God or his Son comes down to the world, showing that the Word comes down without change and that God’s threats and punishments are a cure, not a fit of temper. He then defends the stories of Genesis and the patriarchs, read in their deeper sense, against the charge that they are silly tales, and rejects Celsus’s claim that the world was made no more for man than for the animals, which Celsus thought nearer to God than men.

Translated from the Greek of Koetschau, GCS 2–3 (1899), via the Perseus digital text, which serves as the base text. Each chapter was translated from the Greek and then checked clause by clause against it in a separate review. No earlier English translation was consulted.

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Translated from Koetschau GCS 2 – 3 (1899) — Greek (Greek · Book IV, chapters 1 – 99)

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