Origen of Alexandria, On First Principles

He will say that the ecclesiastical proclamation contains the word about God's righteous anointing, and that this word—once believed to be true—also provokes us to live well and to flee sin in every way. Through it, once we have been consoled by the Lord, we may grasp the most necessary problem. In order to understand what the self-moved is, we must unfold its concept; once that concept is clarified, what we are seeking can be presented clearly.

Of the things that are moved, some have the cause of their movement within themselves, while others are moved only from outside. Therefore, objects that are carried—such as wood, stones, and all matter held together by habit alone—are moved only from outside. Let the notion of the movement of bodies be set aside from the discussion for now, since it is not needed for the present subject. Animals, plants, and all things held together by nature or soul have the cause of being moved within themselves. From this group, they say metals come; besides these, fire is self-moved, and perhaps springs as well. Among the things that have the cause of being moved within themselves, some are said to be moved from themselves, others from outside themselves. The non-living things are moved from outside themselves; the living things are moved from themselves. Living things are moved from themselves when a fantasy occurs that provokes an impulse. Again, in some animals fantasies occur that provoke an impulse, with nature moving the impulse in an orderly way. For example, in the spider a fantasy of weaving occurs and an impulse follows to weave, the spider's imaginative nature moving it in an orderly way to this very thing, with no other thing being believed by the animal after its imaginative nature; and in the bee, the impulse is to shape wax.

The rational animal, however, also has reason alongside its imaginative nature—reason that judges the fantasies, rejecting some and accepting others, so that the animal may be led according to them. Since in the nature of reason there are starting-points for contemplating the good and the bad, by following these we contemplate the good and the bad, choose the good, and turn away from the bad. In doing so we are praiseworthy when we give ourselves to the practice of the good, but blameworthy when we do the opposite. It must not be overlooked, however, that the greater part of the nature ordered toward all things exists in animals, whether to a greater or a lesser degree, so that it comes near—as it were—to the rational work found in tracking dogs and war horses. To be subjected to this or that external thing, a fantasy moving us in such and such a way, is admittedly not in our power. But to judge whether to use what has happened in this way or otherwise is the work of nothing other than the reason within us—either operating in us according to the starting-points that provoke us toward the good and toward duty, or turning us away toward the opposite.