Tertullian, A Treatise on the Soul 56
A debate springs up: does this also happen the moment life ends, or does some reason hold certain souls here for a while, or is it even allowed for souls already received to intervene later from the lower world, whether by choice or by command? None of these opinions lacks persuasive arguments. People have believed that the unburied are not conducted to the lower world before they receive their due rites, following Homer’s account of Patroclus’ funeral, where Patroclus appears to Achilles in a dream and begs him for burial because he cannot otherwise approach the gates of the lower world, since the souls of the buried keep him at a distance. We know, however, that beyond poetic conventions Homer also displays an industrious piety. He placed such great weight on burial, and he also blamed the harmful delay it inflicted on souls; at the same time he wanted to prevent anyone who kept a corpse at home from being tormented himself by excessive grief nourished by the pain of sorrow. Thus the complaints of the unburied soul are settled on both counts: so that the urgency of the funeral and the honor due the body may be preserved, and so that the sorrow of the affections may be tempered. Besides, how vain is it for the soul to sustain the body’s rites, as if it were going to carry something from them to the lower world? It is even more vain if the omission of burial is counted as an injury to the soul, which ought to accept that omission with gratitude. For the soul would certainly prefer to be delayed in being drawn down to the lower world, since it did not wish to die in the first place. It will love the impious heir through whom it still feeds on the light; or if a genuine injury exists in being cast under the earth later, the title of that injury is the omission of burial, through which an unjust injury strikes the soul, even though the omission is not chargeable to the soul but to the nearest relatives. They also say that those cut off by immature death wander here until the remainder of their allotted lifespans is completed, lifespans they would have reached had they not died prematurely. Furthermore, either times are fixed for each person, and I do not believe they can be snatched away; or if they are fixed, they are nevertheless mutilated by the will of God or some power, and they are mutilated in vain if the soul simply waits after they have already been fulfilled; or if they are not fixed, there will be no remainder of times that were never fixed. I add this: look, an infant dies at the breast, suppose a boy just invested with the toga, suppose a youth just assumed the manly gown, who nevertheless would have lived eighty years. What does its soul do here after death with those snatched-away years? It cannot grasp age without a body, because ages operate through bodies. Our people also consider that the same bodies will receive the souls in the resurrection, the bodies in which they died. Therefore the same bodily modes, and the same ages that produce those modes, will also be hoped for. How, then, can an infant’s soul transact the snatched-away years here so that it rises again in the body of a one-month-old? Or if those destined times must be fulfilled here, will the soul also run through the order of life allotted with them here, so that it studies from infancy, delegated to childhood; serves as a soldier from adolescence, stirred to youth; acts as a judge from youth, weighted by old age; exacts interest and works the field, sails, litigates, marries, labors, undergoes illnesses, and experiences whatever sad and joyful things remained with it and the times? But how can these things be transacted without a body? Life without life? The times would be empty, fulfilled only by passing through. What prevents them from being fulfilled in the lower world, where there is just as little use for them? Thus we say that every soul, whatever age it died, stands in that state until that day when the perfect is promised, tempered to the measure of angelic fullness. Therefore neither will those torn away by force be treated as strangers to the lower world, those whom they suppose were violently seized, especially through the atrocities of punishments — I mean the cross, the axe, the sword, and the wild beast; nor will these violent exits, which justice decrees, be avenged by violence. And so, you will say, every wicked soul is excluded from the lower world. You must then establish another: either a good lower world or an evil one. If evil, then the worst souls ought to be cast down there immediately. If good, why do you not judge the same, that immature and unmarried souls, pure and innocent by reason of age, are not worthy of the lower world in the meantime?
Latin
Occurrit disceptatio, an etiam hoc ab excessu statim fiat, an quasdam animas aliqua ratio detineat hic interim, an etiam receptas liceat postea ab inferis ex arbitrio vel ex imperio interve nire: nec harum enim opinionum suasoriae desunt. Creditum est, insepultos non ante ad inferos redigi, quam justa perceperint, secundum homericum Patroclum funus in somnis de Achille flagitantem, quod non alias adire portas inferum posset, arcentibus eum longe animabus sepultorum. Novimus autem, praeter poetica jura, pietatis quoque homericae industriam. Tanto magis enim curam sepulturae collocavit, quanto etiam moram ejus injuriosam animabus incusavit; simul et ne quis defunctum domi detinens ipse amplius cum illo maceretur enormitate solatii dolore nutriti. Ita querelas animae insepultae ad utrumque conficit; ut instantia funeris, et honor corporum servetur, et moeror adfectuum temperetur. Caeterum, quam vanum ut anima corporis justa sustineat, quasi aliquid ex illis ad inferos avehat? Multo vanius, si injuria deputabitur animae cessatio sepulturae, quam pro gratia deberet amplecti. Utique enim tardius ad inferos abstrahi malet, quae nec mori voluit. Amabit impium haeredem, per quem adhuc pascitur luce: aut si qua pro certo injuria est tardius sub terram detrudi, titulus autem injuriae cessatio est sepulturae, per quam iniquum eam injuria adfici, cui non imputabitur cessatio sepulturae, ad proximos scilicet pertinens. Aiunt et immatura morte praevenras eousque vagari isthic, donec reliquatio compleatur aetatum, quas tum pervixissent, si non intempestive obiissent. Porro, aut constituta sunt tempora unicuique, et constituta praeripi posse non credam; aut si constituta sunt quidem, Dei tamen voluntate vel aliqua potestate mutilantur, frustra mutilantur, si jam impleti sustinent; aut si non sunt constituta, nulla erit reliquatio temporum non constitutorum. Adhuc addam: ecce obiit (verbi gratia) infans sub uberum fontibus, puta nunc puer investis, puta vesticeps, qui tamen octoginta annos victurus fuisset: hos praereptos ut anima ejus hic post mortem transigat, quale est? Aetatem enim non potest capere sine corpore; quia per corpora operantur aetates. Nostri autem illud quoque recogitent, corpora eadem recepturas in resurrectione animas, in quibus decesserunt. Iidem ergo sperabuntur et corporum modi, et eaedem aetates quae corporum modos faciunt. Quo ergo pacto potest infantis anima hic transigere praerepta tempora, ut octogenaria resurgat in corpore mensis unius? Aut si hic necesse erit ea tempora impleri quae fuerant destinata, num et ordinem vitae quam sortita sunt tempora pariter cum illis hic destinatum, pariter hic anima decurret, ut et studeat ab infantia, pueritiae delegata; et militet ab adolescentia, juventae excitata; et censeat a juventa, senectae ponderata; et foenus exprimat et agrum urgeat, naviget, litiget, nubat, laboret, aegritudines obeat; et quaecumque illam cum temporibus manebant tristia ac laeta? Sed haec sine corpore quomodo transigentur? vita sine vita? Sed vacua erunt tempora, solo decursu adimplenda. Quid ergo prohibet apud inferos ea impleri, ubi perinde nullus est usus illorum? Ita dicimus omnem animam, quaqua aetate decesserit, in ea stare ad eum diem, usque perfectum illud repromittitur ad angelicae plenitudinis mensuram temperatum. Proinde nec extorres inferum habebuntur, quas vi ereptas arbitrantur, praecipue per atrocitates suppliciorum, crucis dico, et securis, et gladii, et ferae; nec isti porro exitus violenti, quos justitia decernit, violentiae vindex. «Et ideo, inquies, scelestae quaeque animae inferis exulant.» Alterum ergo constituas compello, aut bonos inferos, aut malos. Si malos placet, et jam praecipitari illuc animae pessimae debent. Si bonos, cur idem, animas immaturas, et innuptas, pro conditione aetatis puras et innocuas, interim dignas inferis non judicas?