One God, Old and New Testaments
Tertullian, Against Marcion 26
But it is enough here to show the most perverse God in the very proclamation of solitary goodness, which they refuse to ascribe to Him the kinds of emotions they condemn in the Creator. For if He neither emulates nor becomes angry nor condemns nor harasses—since He does not even provide a judge—I cannot see how their system of discipline can hold together, let alone be more complete. What sort of thing is it to lay down precepts He will not enforce, to forbid offenses He will not avenge because He will not judge, a stranger to every sense of severity and reproof? Why does He forbid what He will not defend when it would be far more consistent not to forbid what He will not defend than to forbid what He will not defend? He should have simply permitted it, without any reason to forbid, so that He would not have to defend it. As it stands, what is forbidden without punishment is silently permitted. And surely He forbids only what He does not love to happen. Therefore the one who is not offended by a deed He does not love to happen is utterly foolish, since offense is the companion of a frustrated will.
Or if He is offended, He ought to become angry; if He becomes angry, He ought to avenge. For vengeance is the fruit of anger, and anger is the debt of offense, and offense, as I said, is the companion of a frustrated will. But He does not avenge; therefore He is not offended. If He is not offended, then His will is not harmed when what He did not want to happen occurs, and the offense now happens according to His will. Because what does not harm the will is not done against the will.
Or if this were the mark of divine virtue or goodness—to not want something to happen and to forbid it, yet not be moved when it does happen—we would say He is already moved, since He did not want it; and it is pointless to claim He is unmoved by the deed when He is moved to prevent it. When He did not want it to happen, He forbade it by that very unwillingness. Did He not also judge by not wanting it and therefore forbidding it? For He judged it not to be done and pronounced that judgment by forbidding it. Hence He does judge. If it is unworthy of God to judge, or if it is worthy only to the extent that He merely does not want and forbids but does not also defend what is admitted, then nothing is more unworthy of God than to fail to execute what He did not want and forbade: first, because any sentence or law of His deserves vindication by authority and the necessity of obedience; second, because the good must emulate what He did not want and forbade, while sparing the evil is more unworthy of God than to punish, and indeed of the best God, who is not good in any other way unless He opposes evil, so that He exercises the love of good through hatred of evil and fulfills the protection of good by expelling evil.
Latin
At hic sufficit peruersissimum deum ostendi in ipso praeconio solitariae bonitatis, qua nolunt ei adscribere eiusmodi motus animi, quos in creatore reprehendunt. si enim neque aemulatur neque irascitur neque damnat neque uexat. utpote qui nec iudicem praestat, non inuenio, quomodo illi disciplinarum ratio consistat, et quidem plenior. quale est enim. ut praecepta constituat non executurus, ut delicta prohibeat non uindicaturus, quia non iudicaturus, extraneus scilicet ab omnibus sensibus seueritatis et animaduersionis? cur enim prohibet admitti quod non defendit admissum, cum multo rectius non prohibuisset quod defensurus non esset quam ut non defenderet quod prohibuisset? immo et permisisse directo debuit, sine causa prohibiturus, ut non defensurus. nam et nunc tacite permissum est quod sine ultione prohibetur. et utique non aliud prohibet admitti quam quod non amat fieri. stupidissimus ergo qui non offenditur facto quod non amat fieri, quando offensa comes sit frustratae uoluntatis. aut si offenditur, debet irasci; si irascitur, debet ulcisci. nam et ultio fructus est irae et ira debitum offensae et offensa, ut dixi, comes frustratae uoluntatis. sed non ulciscitur; ergo nec offenditur, si non offenditur, ergo nec laeditur uoluntas eius, cum fit quod noluit fieri: et fit iam delictum secundum uoluntatem eius. quia non fit aduersus uoluntatem quod non laedit uoluntatem. aut si hoc erit diuinae uirtutis siue bonitatis, nolle quidem fieri et prohibere fieri, non moueri tamen, si fiat, dicimus iam motum esse illum, qui noluit, et uane non moueri ad factum qui motus sit ad non faciendum. I quando noluit fieri; nolendo enim prohibuit. non autem et iudicauit nolendo fieri et idcirco prohibendo? non faciendum enim iudicauit et prohibendo pronuntiauit. ergo et ille iam iudicat. si indignum est deum iudicare, aut si eatenus dignum est deum iudicare, qua tantummodo nolit et prohibeat non etiam defendat admissum, atquin nihil deo tam indignum quam non exequi quod noluit et prohibuit admitti: primo, quod qualicunque sententiae suae et legi debeat uindictam in auctoritatem et obsequii necessitatem, secundo, quia (boni) aemulum sit necesse est quod noluit admitti et nolendo prohibuit, malo autem parcere deum indignius sit quam animaduertere, et quidem deo optimo, qui non alias plane bonus sit, nisi mali aemulus, uti boni amorem odio mali exerceat et boni tutelam expugnatione mali impleat.