Tertullian, On the Resurrection of the Flesh 17

A simple-minded supporter of our view will argue that the flesh must also appear at the judgment because otherwise the soul, being incorporeal, could not experience the torment or refreshment of punishment — that is what the common people think. We, however, both profess and prove in our own treatise that the soul is corporeal, possessing its own kind of substance and solidity, through which it can both feel and suffer. Even now, the example of Lazarus has proven that souls are tormented and comforted among the dead, though they are naked and still exiled from the flesh (Luke 16:19-31). I have therefore granted my opponent this opening: "Since the soul has its own corporeality, it will suffice on its own for the capacity of sensation and suffering, so that it does not need the flesh to be represented." On the contrary, it will need the flesh precisely to the extent that it must feel even with the flesh. Just as the soul suffices on its own for acting, so it suffices for suffering — yet it is less sufficient on its own for acting. On its own it can only think, desire, or plan; to complete its work it awaits the operation of the flesh. In the same way, then, it demands the fellowship of the flesh for suffering, so that it may suffer as fully through the flesh as it could not act fully without it. Therefore, in those matters where the soul suffices on its own, its judgment hangs suspended over its own desires, thoughts, and volitions. Moreover, if those inner states were enough for the fullness of merits, so that deeds would not be required, the soul would suffice on its own for the perfection of judgment concerning the very things it alone could do. But since deeds are also bound to merits, and deeds are administered through the flesh, the soul is no longer sufficient to be comforted or tormented without the flesh — on account of the works of the flesh as well — even if it has a body and limbs. Those limbs, therefore, are not sufficient for it to feel fully, just as they are not sufficient for it to act perfectly. Consequently, in whatever way the soul acted, it also suffers among the dead, first tasting judgment just as it first introduced the offense, yet still awaiting the flesh so that through it the deeds it entrusted to its thoughts may be reckoned. Finally, this will be the reason for the ultimate end of the destined judgment: that the divine censure may be completed by the presentation of the flesh. Otherwise, what souls now undergo among the dead would not be sustained to the end, if judgment were destined for souls alone.