Sacred theology is not among Aristotle's five logical virtues; spiritual things differ in kind from natural disciplines
17. Sacred theology, truly and properly speaking, cannot be referred to any of the five logical virtues that Aristotle explains in Nicomachean Ethics book 6, because the things it considers differ in kind — or by their whole nature and condition — from those things from whose variety and unequal nature those five habits of mind and their ends and aims are deduced.
For the three theoretical perfections or habits turn about necessary things, whose knowledge can be searched out by the keenness of the human mind without the Word of God: the knowledge of spiritual things cannot without the Word of God. Contingent things, of which some fall under our action and others under our making, are placed in our power and were first searched out by human study and industry, so that they can be acquired. Hence civil happiness in Ethics book 1 is everywhere called a human good.
But spiritual things are by no means in a person's power and cannot be acquired at his choice: they either are in us by generation from corrupt seed, as original sin, which is the peculiar disease of the animal human being brought forth into light by natural procreation from the corrupt; or they are God-given (θεόδοτον), that is, they come from heaven by mere grace and mercy — as true conversion to God, faith, remission of sins, regeneration, and so on.
Although this discipline, which must be held most firmly, considers spiritual things, and is therefore diverse in whole kind from the other disciplines called theoretical, practical, or productive: still with those called practical and productive it has no small analogy.
Latin
17. S. Theologia vere et proprie loquendo ad nullam virtutum logicarum quinque, quas explicat Aristoteles lib. 6. Ethic. ad Nicom. referri potest, quia res, quas ipsa considerat, alienae genere, seu tota natura sua et conditione, differunt a rebus illis, e quarum varietate et dispari natura habitus illi quinque mentis et eorum fines et scopi deducuntur. Nam tres quidem theoreticae perfectiones seu hexeis habitus versantur circa res necessarias, quarum cognitio humanae mentis acie absque verbo Dei indagari potest: rerum spiritualium absque verbo Dei non potest. Res autem quae contingentes, quarum aliae sub actionem nostram, aliae sub effectionem cadunt, sunt in nostra potestate positae et hominis studio industriaque indagatae primum sunt, ita ut comparari possunt. Unde et civilis felicitas l. 1. Eth. passim dicitur humanum bonum. At res spirituales nequaquam in hominis potestate sunt et pro ipsius arbitrio comparari possunt, sed vel per generationem ex semine corrupto nobis insunt, ut peccatum originis, quod est idiopathia hominis animalis sive naturali procreatione a corruptis in lucem editi, vel sunt theodoton, h.e. divinitus ex mera gratia et misericordia obveniunt, ut vera ad Deum conversio, fides, remissio peccatorum, regeneratio etc. Etsi autem haec disciplina, quod firmissime tenendum est, res consideret spirituales, ac propterea diversa sit toto genere a caeteris disciplinis, quae vel theoreticae, vel practicae, vel poeticae dicuntur: tamen cum iis, quae practicae dicuntur, et effectrices, non exiguam habet analogiam.