Two kinds of discipline; assent in the first rests on the dictate of right reason
7. Here we take as settled that disciplines the human mind can grasp fall into two kinds. One stands under the light of reason. The other — once reason's light is already presupposed and set in its apt place for use — is known under the light of faith, that is, of divine revelation.
8. In the first kind, the ground of assent is the dictate of right reason. By that phrase we do not mean the rational soul itself, or the human intellect as such. That the intellect can err and be deceived — and often is, even in the wisest of mortals — no one doubts. Nor does it stumble only in matters of faith, where it must trip forever unless the Holy Spirit guides and Scripture holds the torch. It also errs, and often, in civil affairs and in the practical business of this life.
9. So "right reason" here is not an intellect that never errs or strikes against anything. It is only the intellect's right judgment about a matter that is either known by nature or follows by legitimate inference from naturally known principles. That remaining judgment after the fall — however much of it is left in us — is what we call right reason: theoretical when it judges theoretical things, practical when it judges practical things.
10. Whenever people say that right reason teaches this or that, or that something agrees with right reason, they mean that the claim is true and certain — either because it is a principle known by nature, or because it can be drawn from such a principle by sound consequence. Right reason, then, is nothing other than true judgment about what natural principles let us know.
11. Many today misuse the word "reason" on its worse side, as if it meant only human corruption. Scripture regularly takes it in the good sense (Romans 12:1; Romans 2:15; compare 1 Peter 2:1). So Gregory Nazianzen, in Oration 2 on theoretical reason: Reason, he says, is given us by God, innate in all, and is so far the first law inhering in everyone that by contemplating what falls under sight it leads us to God. Augustine, On Free Choice of the Will II.18: You look at justice, he says — no one uses it badly. It is counted among the highest goods that are in the human being himself, together with all the soul's virtues that make up an upright and honorable life. For no one uses prudence, fortitude, or temperance badly. In all of them, as in that justice you just named, RIGHT REASON thrives; without it there are no virtues; and no one can use RIGHT REASON badly.
Latin
7. Posuimus autem hoc in loco tanquam certum, duo in universum esse disciplinarum, humana mente comprehensibilium, genera, quorum alterum sub luce rationis; alterum vero, lumine rationis jam supposito & ad usum apte congruenterque reposito, sub lumine fidei sive divinae revelationis cognoscatur. 8. In priore disciplinarum genere, ratio assentiendi est dictamen rectae rationis, qua non intelligitur ipsa anima rationalis, seu ipse hominis intellectus. Hunc enim errare ac decipi posse, atque adeo saepe decipi, vel in sapientissimo mortalium, nullum est dubium. Neque vero ille errat tantum in rebus fidei, in quibus sane necessum est, eum caespitare perpetuo, nisi Spiritu s. duce & facem praelucente scriptura: sed etiam saepissime in civilibus & iis, quae ad hujus vitae rationes pertinent. 9. Non igitur hic vocatur recta ratio, hominis intellectus, qui nulla in re erret aut impingat, sed rectum duntaxat intellectus judicium de re, quae sive naturaliter nota est, sive ex principiis naturaliter notis legitime sequitur. Hoc, inquam, judicium intellectus, quantumcunque post lapsum in nobis reliquum est, recta ratio appellatur, theoretica quidem, cum de rebus theoreticis judicat, practica, quando de rebus practicis. 10. Quotiescunque igitur dicitur, rectam rationem hoc vel illud docere, aut rectae rationi aliquid consentaneum esse, id intelligitur, verum illud ac certum esse, vel quia sit principium natura notum, vel quia ex ejusmodi aliquo principio per bonam consequentiam deduci possit; ideoque rectam rationem nihil aliud esse, quam verum judicium de rebus, quae ex naturalibus principiis cognoscuntur. 11. Perperam igitur a multis hodie vox rationis in sequiore parte tantum pro ipsa corruptione hominis usurpatur, cum scriptura passim in bonam partem accipiat, ut Rom. 12. v. 1. & c. 2. v. 15. & 1. Pet. 2. v. 1. Hinc Gregorius Nazianzenus orat. 2. de ratione theoretica, Ratio, inquit, nobis a Deo data, innata universis, primaque in nobis adeo lex omnibus inhaerens per eorum, quae sub aspectum cadunt, contemplationem ad Deum deducit. Augustinus vero lib. 2. de libero arbitrio cap. 18. Intueris, inquit, justitiam, qua nemo male utitur. Haec inter summa bona, quae in ipso homine sunt, numeratur, omnesque virtutes animi, quibus ipsa recta vita & honesta constat: nam neque prudentia, neque fortitudine, neque temperantia male quis utitur: in his omnibus, sicut in ipsa etiam, quam tu commemorasti, justitia RECTA RATIO viget, sine qua virtutes esse non possunt: RECTA autem RATIONE male uti nemo potest.