IV–V. Actions and passions are of the whole person; reason persuades but does not compel
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IV.From a principle conceded by all — namely, as actions are of the subjects, so also passions, and so also rewards and punishments: but now it is certain that the soul alone is not the human.Yet if what is the case must be confessed, this reason persuades, yet does not compel and prove.For since the soul is the principal cause of action, but the body the instrument, it cannot be proved that justice does not stand consistent with itself if the principal cause is affected with reward or punishment, the instrument meanwhile left aside — especially if the matter has come to that.
Latin
IV. A principio ab omnibus concesso, nempe, ut actiones sunt suppositorum, ita & passiones, adeoque & praemia & poenae: jam vero certum est, solam animam hominem non esse. Verum si fatendum est quod res est, haec ratio suadet, non tamen cogit & evincit. Cum enim anima sit princeps actionis causa, corpus vero instrumentum, probari nequit justitiam sibi non constare, si princeps causa praemio vel poena afficiatur, relicto interim instrumento; praesertim si res eo devenerit.