II-III: object of power; possibility and impossibility
II. But in it there is to be considered the object, the condition, and the distinction. III. The object is everything which God, as true and possible being comprehended by His infinite intellect, can freely will. For whatever God can freely will, that same He can also do; and whatever He can do, that same He can freely will.
But God can freely will only those things which are not contrary to His essence and natural will and which can be comprehended by His infinite intellect as true beings, at least as possible. Possibility of a thing is principally from Gods intellect, but formally from the formal reason of things. Hence not because of Gods power, but because of inherent contradiction in the thing, there is no power with respect to contradictories.
And hence God is said to be able to do all possibles which agree with His nature, intellect, and will: all the rest are impossible, because they involve contradiction, impotence, perversity, and falsehood — as to make another God, to be changed, to lie, to sin, to make something simultaneously be and not be. When we deny that these can be done by God, we do not injure His infinite power, but we take care that things incongruous to Gods essence, intellect, and will not be attributed. Compare Luke 1:37; 18:27; Mark 14:36; James 1:17; Psalm 5:4; Numbers 23:19; 2 Timothy 2:13.
Latin
II. Est autem in ea considerandum objectum, conditio et distinctio. III. Objectum est omne id, quod Deus ut ens verum ac possibile infinito intellectu suo comprehensum, libere velle potest. Nam quicquid Deus libere velle potest, id ipsum etiam facere potest; et quicquid facere potest, id ipsum libere velle potest. Potest autem Deus ea duntaxat libere velle, quae essentiae ipsius et naturali voluntati non sunt contraria et ab intellectu ipsius infinito tanquam entia vera, saltem possibilia, comprehendi possunt. Possibilitas rei principiative ab intellectu Dei, formaliter vero ex ratione rerum formali. Unde non propter potentiam Dei, sed propter formalem repugnantiam rei, nulla est potentia respectu contradictoriorum. Et hinc Deus dicitur facere posse omnia possibilia, quae congruunt ipsius naturae, intellectui et voluntati: caetera omnia impossibilia, quippe quae contradictionem, impotentiam, perversitatem, mendacium continent — ut Deum alium facere, mutari, mentiri, peccare, efficere ut aliquid simul sit et non sit. Cum autem haec a Deo fieri posse negamus, non facimus potentiae illius infinitae injuriam, sed cavemus ne essentiae, intellectui et voluntati Dei incongrua tribuantur. Confer Luc. I.37; XVIII.27; Marc. XIV.36; Jac. I.17; Psal. V.5; Num. XXIII.19; II Tim. II.13.