XI observations 3-5
3. Because a thing in itself varies according to difference of time, therefore when we speak of power as referred to the thing, it is necessary that we use diverse forms of speaking. Thus God at one time was about to make from power, and at another time from the same power He makes, and at another He has made. To be about to make is not to make, and to make is not to have made. And therefore it does not follow: whatever God could do, He can always do, because before the thing He could do something when the thing was only in potency, which He cannot do when the thing is perfected. But it rightly follows: whatever He could at some time do, He can always do, provided the makers power is always toward that.
4. It is indeed true that whatever is in God is act and nothing in potency: yet it does not follow from this that whatever He could do He can always do. For power is with respect to that which can be done, and not with respect to that which has been done. Therefore this proposition — whatever God could at some time do, He can always do — is simply to be denied. But this is true: whatever God could at some time do and is of the subject of divine power, this He can always do.
5. From Gods omnipotence it cannot be concluded that something is or will be, unless it is established concerning Gods will. The reason is this: because Gods free will determines power to doing this or that, and God therefore does something because He wills to do it — Daniel 3:17-18; Romans 4:20-21; Matthew 8:2; Luke 1. Therefore here that saying has place, that reason is to be taken captive under the obedience of faith, namely when Gods will is established, even if our mind does not grasp the possibility of the thing. Compare Calvin, Institutes 4.16.24. CHAPTER EIGHTEEN, On Gods attributes of the third genus, follows.
Latin
3. Quia res in seipsa variatur secundum differentiam temporis, ideo, cum loquimur de potentia secundum quod refertur ad rem, necesse est ut diversis loquendi formis utamur. Sic Deus aliquando fuit ex potentia facturus, et aliquando ex eadem potentia facit, et aliquando fecit. Facturum esse non est facere, et facere non est fecisse. Et ideo non sequitur: quicquid Deus potuit facere, potest semper facere, quia ante rem potuit aliquid facere cum res non esset nisi in potentia, quod non potest facere cum res perfecta est. Sed recte sequitur: quicquid aliquando potuit facere, semper potest facere, dummodo potentia facientis semper sit ad illud. 4. Verum quidem est quod quicquid est in Deo, actus est et nihil in potentia: tamen non sequitur ex hoc quod quicquid potuit facere, semper possit facere. Potentia enim est respectu ejus quod fieri potest, et non respectu ejus quod factum est. Quapropter haec propositio: quicquid Deus aliquando potuit facere, semper potest facere, simpliciter neganda est. Haec autem est vera: quicquid Deus aliquando potuit facere et est de subjecto divinae potentiae, hoc semper potest facere. 5. Ex omnipotentia Dei non potest concludi aliquid esse aut fore, nisi constet de voluntate Dei. Ratio haec est, quia voluntas Dei libera potentiam ad hoc illudve agendum determinat, et Deus propterea aliquid facit quia id facere vult — Dan. III.17-18; Rom. IV.20-21; Matth. VIII.2; Luc. I. Idcirco hic locum habet illud, rationem captivandam esse sub obsequium fidei, quando nempe de voluntate Dei constat, etiamsi mens nostra possibilitatem rei non capiat. Confer Calv. Inst. IV.16.24. CAPUT DECIMUM OCTAVUM, De attributis Dei tertii generis, sequitur.