Two Dissertations · §620 · John Davenant

Cap. IX Arg. 6 Sol cont.: Thomas — free will disordered toward evil cannot offer no impediment to grace; God sometimes converts even those who impede; the difference hangs on simple will

Thomas reasons far better here. He teaches that free will, already disordered toward evil, is not so set that it offers no impediment to divine grace (Contra Gent. 3.160). Then (cap. 161) he adds that God nonetheless sometimes, from abundance of his goodness, turns even those who impede grace away from evil and converts them to good — and that this happens only in those in whom he wills his mercy to appear, so that in all others the order of justice is shown. Why he converts these who put an obstacle and not others is not to be sought; it hangs on his simple will. So Corvinus vainly attacks reprobation from God's readiness to give richer grace to all who use received grace so as to do whatever they can by it — since no one does that, and since not finally opposing an obstacle to divine grace itself flows from election and does not precede election.

Latin

Multo melius hac de re philosophatur Thomas, qui docet, in libero arbitrio per inordinationem praecedentem ad malum inclinato, non esse situm ut nullum impedimentum gratiae Divinae praestet, Contra Gent. l. 3. c. 160. Deinde adjungit, cap. 161. Deum tamen interdum ex abundantia bonitatis suae eos etiam qui impedimentum gratiae praestant, avertere a malo, et convertere ad bonum. Tandem et illud addit, Hoc fieri in illis solis, in quibus vult suam misericordiam apparere, ita quod in aliis omnibus justitiae ordo manifestetur. Hujus autem discriminis, quare hos ponentes obicem convertat, alios non convertat, rationem inquirendam non esse, quia dependet ex simplici ejus voluntate. Frustra igitur Corvinus ex eo reprobationem impugnat, quod Deus paratus sit uberiorem gratiam dare illis omnibus, qui ita utuntur gratia accepta, ut faciant quodcunque per eam possunt facere, cum nemo hoc praestet, et cum hoc ipsum, non finaliter opponere obicem gratiae Divinae, ex electione dimanet, non autem praecedat electionem.

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John Davenant argues from Scripture that Christ's death is a remedy offered to every person, so that anyone who hears the Gospel may be called to believe, and then opens a second dissertation on predestination.

John Davenant (1572–1641) was Lady Margaret Professor of Divinity at Cambridge, bishop of Salisbury from 1621, and England's leading delegate to the Synod of Dort. A Reformed theologian of the moderate school, he defended universal atonement language within a Calvinist frame.

The Two Dissertations (1650) press two theses: that Christ died sufficiently for all, and that God sincerely calls all who hear the gospel — against the novel claim that Christ died only for the elect in every sense. They are Davenant's mature statement of the hypothetical-universalist position that divided English Calvinists.

This volume covers the opening of the first dissertation through the close of chapter 3, with the theses on the extent of Christ's death.

Date1572–1641 AD (Bishop of Salisbury; 1650 Cambridge imprint)

The 1683 reprint was not used as base text. No modern English was copied.

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