Cap. IX Arg. 7: if reprobation is antecedent and not from foresight of future impenitence, then the impenitence for which reprobates are damned flows from the reprobation decree — unjust
If reprobation is set as antecedent and not from foresight of future impenitence and unbelief, it will follow that the impenitence and unbelief for which the reprobate are damned flow from the reprobation decree. But it is unjust to damn anyone for what follows from antecedent reprobation — a pure mere act of God. At the Hague Colloquy the Remonstrants press this: if we place reprobation otherwise than from foresighted unbelief, the corollary is that we must own unbelief itself as fruit of that reprobation. Hence their argument: if unbelief follows from reprobation unto destruction, God cannot, his justice safe, destroy the reprobate for their unbelief, because that necessarily follows from reprobation — which is God's own work. Therefore, they say, we must place reprobation as sprung from foresight of final unbelief.
Latin
Posita reprobatione antecedanea, et non ex praevisione futurae impoenitentiae et infidelitatis, sequetur hanc impoenitentiam et infidelitatem, propter quam reprobi damnantur, fluere ex decreto reprobationis; Est autem injustum propter illud aliquem damnare, quod ex reprobatione antecedente (quae purus putus Dei actus est) sequitur. In colloquio Hagiensi hoc urgetur a Remonstrantibus, qui videntur sentire, si ponamus reprobationem aliter factam quam ex praevisa infidelitate, consectarium esse, ut ipsam infidelitatem dictae reprobationis fructum agnoscamus. Atque hinc illa argumentatio: Si infidelitas ex reprobatione ad exitium consequitur, non potest Deus salva justitia sua reprobatos propter infidelitatem ipsorum perdere, ob id quod ex reprobatione (quae quidem est ipsius Dei opus) necessario sequitur: Reprobationem igitur ponere debemus ex praevisione infidelitatis finalis oriundam.