On the Soul, to Tatian · §4 · Gregory Thaumaturgus

That the soul is a substance

The soul fits the definition of substance, since it stays one and the same while receiving opposite qualities such as justice and injustice; and what gives life to the body, itself a substance, must also be a substance.

Further, that the soul is a substance is shown as follows. First, because the definition of substance rightly fits it as well. That definition runs like this: a substance is that which, while remaining one and the same in number, receives contraries in turn. That the soul, without departing from its own nature, receives contraries in turn is plain to everyone, I think. For justice and injustice, courage and cowardice, temperance and intemperance are seen in it by turns, and these are contraries. Since it is the property of substance to receive contraries in turn, and this same property belongs to the soul, the soul will therefore be a substance.

Moreover, since the body is a substance, the soul too must be a substance. For it cannot be that what receives life is a substance, while what gives life is not a substance, unless perhaps someone is so mad as to claim that what is not is the cause of what is; or again, to hold that a thing whose very being so depends on another that it cannot exist without it is the cause of the very thing on which it depends.

Latin

Quod porro Anima sit substantia, sic ostenditur: Primo quidem, quoniam illi quoque definitio substantiae iure convenit, quae quidem est eiusmodi: Substantia est id, quod cum unum et idem sit numero, contraria vicissim suscipit. Quod vero Anima a natura propria non recedens, contraria vicissim suscipiat, omnibus credo est perspicuum. Iustitia enim et iniustitia, fortitudo et timiditas, temperantia et intemperantia, in ipsa vicissim cernuntur, quum sint contraria. Quamobrem cum ea substantiae sit proprietas, ut contrariorum vicissim susceptrix sit, eademque Animae conveniat; substantia igitur anima erit. Praeterea, cum et corpus sit substantia, Animam quoque substantiam esse necesse est. Neque enim fieri potest, ut quod vitam accipit, substantia sit; illud autem quod vitam praebet, non sit substantia. Nisi forte quis ita insaniat, ut id quod non est, eius quod est, causam esse affirmet: aut rursus id, cuius illud ipsum quod est, ex alio sic pendet, ut absque illo esse nequeat, eius, ipsius, ex quo pendet, causam esse velit.

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About this text

Gregory Thaumaturgus, On the Soul, to Tatian: a fresh English translation of the whole short treatise. Arguing from reason alone, without Scripture proofs, it shows that the soul is known by its effects, exists, is a substance, is not a body, is simple, is immortal and shares in reason. Scholars dispute whether Gregory wrote it.

Gregory Thaumaturgus (c. 213–c. 270) wrote this treatise to his friend Tatian. Gregory was bishop of Neocaesarea in Pontus and had studied with Origen in Caesarea in Palestine. Tatian asked him to send a discourse and disputation on the soul, and Gregory complied promptly, trusting in Tatian's goodwill toward him.

Tatian did not need the work for his own assurance, since he was already instructed in the divine Scriptures and traditions. He wanted it for confuting people who refuse to believe the Scriptures and who use clever speech to circumvent and deceive those unaccustomed to such debate. Gregory therefore agreed to write using only human reasoning and common notions, not scriptural testimonies.

The treatise follows the customary order of inquiry for such subjects. Gregory first proposes the criterion by which the soul can be grasped according to nature, then shows by what arguments its existence is demonstrated. He examines whether the soul is substance or accident, body or incorporeal, simple or composite, mortal or immortal, and finally whether it is rational. For proofs he uses only common notions by which assent is usually obtained for evident things, choosing the reasonings most effective for demonstrating each point. He then carries out this plan: the soul is known from what it does; it exists, since it moves the body and gives it life; it is a substance, not a body; it is simple; it is immortal; and it is rational.

Printed text used

Translated from Opera omnia, Greek and Latin (Paris: Sonnius, Morel and Cramoisy, 1622), page images (Latin column (Greek damaged))
Also checked Archive DjVu machine-read text (Latin/Greek mixed machine-read text)
Translated from Latin preface (Latin)

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Preface — Long-s and column joins expanded from the Latin face; sense checked against the inquiry program that follows.

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