That the soul is not a body
Five arguments show that the soul is not a body: how it is present in the body, how it moves, how it is nourished, the dilemma of whether it is animate, and its lack of color, size and shape.
We have shown above that the soul is in our body; we must now learn how it is in the body. For if it lies against the body as one stone lies against another, it follows that the soul is a body, and that not the whole body is animate, since the soul clings only to some part of it. But if it is mixed and blended with the body, it will have fallen from what properly makes it a soul; it will consist of many parts and will not be simple. For what has many parts can be divided and dissolved; what can be divided is composite; and what is composite can be divided in three ways. Again, a body joined to a body increases its bulk; but the soul, being in the body, does not make it swell, but rather makes it alive. The soul, therefore, is not a body but incorporeal.
Besides this, if the soul were a body, it would be moved either from outside or from within. But it is not moved from outside, for it is moved neither by pushing nor by pulling, as inanimate things are. Nor is it moved from within, as animate things are, for it is absurd to speak of a soul of the soul. The soul, then, is not a body; it is therefore incorporeal.
Again, if the soul is a body, it also has qualities that the senses perceive, and it is nourished. But it is not nourished. But if it is nourished, it is not nourished in a bodily way, as a body is, but in an incorporeal way, for it is nourished by reason and by the word. It does not, then, have qualities the senses can perceive. For justice is not seen with the eyes, nor courage, nor anything else of that kind, and these are the qualities of the soul. The soul, therefore, is not a body; it is incorporeal.
Further, since every bodily substance is divided into animate and inanimate, let those who claim that the soul is a body tell us whether they want it called animate or inanimate.
Finally, if every body has color, quantity and shape, and nothing of the kind is seen in the soul, then the soul is not a body.
Latin
In corpore quidem nostro Animam esse superius ostensum est: quomodo autem sit in corpore, cognoscere oportet. Nam si illi ita adiacet, ut lapis lapidi: sequitur, quod corpus sit Anima, nec totum corpus animatum esse, cum parti cuidam solum adhaereat. Sin autem cum corpore mista, confusaque sit; e propria Animae ratione deiecta, multis partibus constabit, nec simplex erit. Quod enim multarum est partium, divisibile est ac dissolubile: quod autem potest dividi, compositum est: compositum vero tripliciter dividi potest. Corpus autem adiunctum corpori, molem auget: Anima vero in corpore existens, illud non tumidum, sed vivum potius reddit. Non igitur corpus, sed incorporea est Anima. Ad haec, si corpus esset Anima, aut extrinsecus, aut intrinsecus moveretur. Non autem extrinsecus movetur: non enim impulsione, neque tractione movetur, ut inanimata: neque intrinsecus movetur, sicut animata. Absurdum enim est, Animam animae dicere. Non ergo Anima est corpus: incorporea igitur. Et rursus, si corpus est Anima, etiam qualitates habet quae percipiuntur sensibus, et nutritur: sed non nutritur. Quod si nutritur, non corporee nutritur, ut corpus, sed incorporee: nam ratione et verbo nutritur: non igitur sensibiles qualitates habet: Neque enim oculis cernitur iustitia, neque fortitudo, neque alia eius generis, quae sunt Animae qualitates: quapropter corpus non est anima: incorporea igitur. Praeterea, cum omnis substantia corporea, in animatam vel inanimatam dividatur; dicant qui Animam corpus esse affirmant, animatamne dici eam velint, an inanimatam. Denique, si corpus omne colorem, quantitatem, et figuram habet: nihil autem eiusmodi in Anima conspicitur: non igitur anima est corpus.