Baron: the will is not bound by necessity of the consequent nor by any motive necessity from God
Robert Baron, formerly professor at the Academy of Aberdeen, holds the same in his General Metaphysics Adapted to the Use of Theology. Among much else he makes two claims there.
First, the will is not held or bound, in producing its acts, by necessity in the absolute sense, what they call necessity of the consequent. Second, the will, even of fallen man, is not held by any motive or impulsive necessity with respect to God.
"He too," Baron says, "gave men free choice. So he does not do away with that faculty entirely by laying necessity on it, either through his eternal decree or through a motion and bending in time." (Section 12, Disputation 1, On Freedom of Choice, number 17.)
Latin
XVIII. Idem quoque sentit Rob. Baronius olim in Academia Abredonensi Professor in Metaphysica sua generali ad Theologiae usum accommodata, ubi inter alia multa haec duo asserit, Primo voluntatem in suis actionibus eliciendis non teneri, vel constringi necessitate absolute dicta, quam appellant necessitatem consequentis. Deinde voluntatem, etiam hominis lapsi, nulla necessitate motiva, vel impulsiva teneri respectu Dei. Ille etiam, inquit, hominibus liberum arbitrium dedit, & per consequens non tollit totaliter eam facultatem, ei imponendo necessitatem, aut per decretum suum aeternum, aut per temporariam motionem, & inflexionem. Sect. 12. Disp. 1. de libertate Arbitrii num. 17.