Le Blanc: the first view does not really differ from the second, only states it less distinctly
To give my own view as well: I think the first opinion, which defines freedom as exemption from compulsion in an agent acting on reason's judgement, does not differ in substance from the second, which opposes freedom not only to compulsion but also to the necessity that comes from matter or sense, called by some physical necessity.
The first opinion holds that exemption from compulsion does not deserve the name of freedom except in a being that uses reason. Plainly, then, it assumes that freedom requires the agent to follow reason's judgement and not to be settled by matter or sense. So the second opinion differs from the first only in being stated more precisely and more fully.
Latin
XIX. Ut autem quid mihi quoque videtur aperiam, existimo primam sententiam quae libertatem definit immunitatem a coactione in eo qui agit ex judicio rationis, reipsa non differre a secunda sententia, quae libertatem opponit non tantum coactioni, sed etiam necessitati quae a materia vel a sensu oritur, quam alii Physicam necessitatem vocant. Quandoquidem enim statuit immunitatem a coactione non esse dignam nomine libertatis, nisi in eo qui ratione utitur; evidenter supponit ad libertatem requiri, ut agens rationis judicium sequatur, non vero a materia, vel a sensu determinetur. Adeoque haec secunda sententia a priori non differt, nisi quod proponitur distinctius & explicatius.