Both views wrongly confuse the free with the voluntary
Both views share one drawback: they wholly confuse the free with the voluntary and hold that every act of the will is free. In the common understanding of men and in ordinary usage, we call free only what is in our power, what could be otherwise, and what we are allowed to weigh and deliberate about.
But as shown above, there are acts of the will to which it is so fixed by nature that they cannot be otherwise in any way, and about which no deliberation can be held. Further, every act that comes from us freely can fall under precepts and be commanded or forbidden by some law, divine or human. That does not fit at all the acts toward which the will stands quite unchangeably, so that in no state could it, or ever can it, act otherwise.
Lastly, the men we are dealing with admit a great difference among the will's acts. Some are in our power, so that we can weigh and deliberate about them and, as the practical mind judges one way or another, do them, leave them undone, or even do the opposite; the others are of a quite different kind. Why, then, will they not give things that differ in nature different names too, and, following the usage of the schools, reserve 'free' for the first and 'voluntary' for the second? A wise man does not leave the common way of speaking without need.
Latin
XX. In utraque autem istud incommodi est quod omnino confundunt liberum & voluntarium, & statuunt omnes actus voluntatis liberos esse. Nam juxta sensum communem hominum, & receptum loquendi usum, istud solum liberum nobis esse dicitur, quod in nostra potestate est, quod potest aliter se habere, & de quo nobis consultare & deliberare licet. Jam vero, ut supra ostendimus, sunt quidam voluntatis actus, ad quos per naturam sic determinata est, ut nullo modo possint aliter se habere, & de quibus nulla potest institui deliberatio. Adde quod omnes actus qui a nobis libere procedunt possunt praeceptis quibusdam subjacere, & lege aliqua divina, vel humana mandari, sive prohiberi. Istud autem nullo modo convenit iis actibus circa quos voluntas plane immutabiliter se habet, ita ut in nullo statu potuerit, vel possit unquam aliter agere. Denique cum illi quibuscum nobis res est, fateantur & agnoscant magnum discrimen esse inter actus voluntatis, nempe quosdam sic esse in nostra potestate, ut de iis possimus consultare & deliberare; illosque pro vario mentis practicae judicio, vel facere, vel omittere, aut etiam contrarium agere; aliorum vero plane diversam esse rationem; cur nolunt res natura distinctas, distinctis quoque vocibus signare, & juxta usum in Scholis receptum illis quidem liberi, his vero voluntarii nomen appropriare? cum sapientis sit sine necessitate a communi loquendi modo non recedere.