Rivet accepts the definition in the divided sense, following Diego Alvarez
Andrew Rivet, too, does not object to calling free choice the faculty of the will by which, when everything prerequisite for acting is present, it can act or not act, provided this is taken in the divided sense and not the composite.
His words, in the Summary of Controversies (treatise 4, question 3), are: "That is, if one says that when all the antecedent requisites for the act are present, in order of reason or of time, free choice can act or not act, meaning that together with those same prerequisites there is in free choice the faculty and power by which it can act or not act if it wills, as Diego Alvarez distinguishes. For even God's efficacious motion, by which the will is settled on such an act, does not take from free choice the faculty to do that act or the contrary one. It only brings it about that free choice, though able to do or not do such an act, does it infallibly, yet freely."
He adds that created free choice, not only before it is settled on one act but at the very instant in which God settles it and it settles itself on that act, has at the same time the power by which it can produce the contrary act if it wills. It does not, however, have a power to have the contrary act at the same time, because two contrary acts cannot be in one power at once, only one after the other.
Latin
XXXI. Non improbat quoque Andreas Rivetus ut liberum arbitrium dicatur talis facultas voluntatis, qua positis omnibus ad agendum praerequisitis, possit agere, aut non agere. Modo id intelligatur non in sensu composito sed in sensu diviso. Nempe, si quis dicat, positis omnibus antecedentibus requisitis, secundum ordinem rationis, vel temporis ad actum, liberum arbitrium posse operari, vel non operari, ita videlicet, ut cum eisdem praerequisitis stet simul in libero arbitrio facultas, & potentia, qua possit operari, vel non operari si velit, ut distinguit Didacus Alvares, quia etiam motio Dei efficax qua ad talem actum voluntas determinatur, non tollit a libero arbitrio facultatem operandi illum actum, vel operandi actum contrarium, sed solum efficit, quod cum liberum arbitrium possit operari, & non operari talem actum, infallibiliter, libere tamen, operetur illum. Quae sunt verba viri illius Doctissimi summae controversiarum tract. 4. quaest. 3. Quibus addit liberum arbitrium creatum, non solum antequam determinetur ad unum actum, sed etiam in ipso instanti, in quo determinatur a Deo, & seipsum determinat ad eundem actum, simul habere potentiam, qua potest actum contrarium producere si velit, non tamen ad actum contrarium simul habendum, quia duo actus contrarii simul in eadem potentia esse non possunt, sed successive.