Crocius defines liberty as the will's natural property to choose and to take up or suspend action
Ludwig Crocius in particular, while he lived doctor and professor of theology at the School of Bremen, gives this definition of freedom and no other: "The freedom of the human will is its natural property by which it can choose what the intellect or sense sets before it under the aspect of good, and, when everything needed for acting is present, can will to take up an action or to hold it back." (Theological Syntagma, book 3, chapter 37, thesis 3.)
He adds there that the ancient Fathers spoke of free choice in the same sense. And in explaining the same thesis he notes that freedom, the will's natural property, is opposed to necessity, whether it comes from an outside cause that compels or from nature fixing the will inwardly and absolutely on one outcome.
Latin
XXXII. Praesertim vero Ludovicus Crocius dum viveret in Schola Bremensi Theologiae Doctor & Professor, hanc & non aliam libertatis definitionem tradit, Libertas humanae voluntatis, est ejus naturalis proprietas, qua ab intellectu, aut sensu sub ratione boni sibi proposita eligere, & positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, actionem suscipere velle, aut suspendere potest. In Theol. Syntag. lib. 3. cap. 37. thes. 3. Ubi subjungit liberum arbitrium eodem sensu a Patribus antiquis dictum esse. Ut & in ejusdem Theseos explicatione notat libertatem quae voluntatis proprietas naturalis est, opponi necessitati, sive illa sit a causa externa cogente, sive a natura intrinsecus ad unum absolute determinante.