Amyraut: freedom in the acts of commanded faculties, of the will, and of the intellect, whose freedom is self-action
Some of the Reformed, however, reason differently about this. Among them is the distinguished Moses Amyraut. To explain his view on the question, he notes that freedom is ascribed to three kinds of acts: first, the acts of the faculties the will commands; second, the acts of the will itself; third, the acts of the intellect.
In the first respect, on his view, freedom is nothing but the ability to live or act as you will, for we count as free when, with nothing forcing or blocking us, we do what we want. In the second respect he defines freedom as "the ability to will as we judge should be willed, each person being settled on it by his own judgement and not another's." Bodily actions are counted free because they depend on a free source, the will; in the same way, he says, the will's actions are free because they too depend on a free source, the judgement of the intellect.
The intellect's freedom he places in its autopragia: the intellect acts from itself and through itself, and is autexousios, in control of its own operations, since it is neither forced by violence to perform them nor dependent on anyone else's command. So freedom, with respect to the acts of the mind and intellect, is a self-governing power of judging about things that comes neither from outside force nor from outside command. That learned man develops this more fully in his short book On Free Choice, section 1, p. 20 and following.
Latin
XXXVIII. Quidam tamen inter Reformatos aliter ea de re Philosophantur. De quorum numero est Vir Clarissimus Moses Amyraldus. Ille ergo, ut mentem suam in hac quaestione explicet, observat libertatem tribus actuum generibus tribui. Et 1. quidem actibus earum facultatum quibus imperat voluntas. 2. Actibus voluntatis ipsius. 3. Actibus intellectus. Primo respectu, ex ejus sententia, libertas non est aliud quam facultas vivendi, seu agendi ut velis. Eatenus enim liberi censemur, quum nullo cogente, vel impediente, facimus id quod volumus. Secundo respectu libertas ab ipso definitur, Facultas volendi ut judicamus esse volendum, & ut quisque proprio judicio determinatur ad id, non alieno. Nam quemadmodum actiones corporeae censentur esse liberae, quia pendent ex principio libero, nempe voluntate, sic actiones voluntatis liberas esse dicit, quia pendent itidem ex principio libero, nempe, ex arbitrio intellectus. Libertatem autem intellectus sitam esse dicit in ejus αὐτοπραγίᾳ, id est, in eo quod intellectus ex se, & per se agit, estque αὐτεξούσιος, id est, potens suarum ipsius operationum, quia, scilicet, ad eas exercendas neque vi cogitur, neque ex alieno imperio pendet: adeo ut libertas, respectu actionum mentis & intellectus sit potestas judicandi de rebus αὐτεξούσιος, & quae neque a vi externa, neque ab externo imperio est. Quae latius exponit Vir ille Doctissimus libello de libero arbitrio Sect. 1. pag. 20. & seqq.