Amyraut infers that freedom belongs first to the intellect, the governing part, not formally to the will
From this teaching it follows that the freedom found in outward actions depends in them on the will, while the freedom that belongs to the will's acts depends in them on the intellect. The intellect, however, is free in itself. So freedom belongs first and chiefly to the intellect and should be placed there as in its own natural seat.
Hence freedom is not, as many would have it, formally in the will alone while being in the intellect only as its cause and root. The same learned man teaches this and tries to prove it on p. 30 and following of his short book.
His main argument is that in his judgement the intellect is by nature more its own master than the will. The will follows the intellect's lead and is subject, as it were, to its rule, which is why the Greeks call the intellect to hegemonikon, the governing part. He thinks it absurd that freedom should be formally in the faculty under another's command rather than in the one bound by the laws of no other faculty.
Latin
XXXIX. Ex qua doctrina sequitur libertatem illam quae in actionibus externis reperitur, in iis dependenter esse a voluntate: eam vero quae convenit actibus voluntatis, in illis dependenter esse ab intellectu, intellectum vero esse per se liberum, adeoque libertatem primario & praecipue intellectui competere, & in eo esse reponendam, tanquam in propria & naturali sede: ac proinde libertatem non esse formaliter, ut multis placet, in sola voluntate; in intellectu vero tantum causaliter & radicaliter, sicuti docet, & probare contendit idem ille Vir Doctissimus libelli sui pag. 30. & sequentibus: Et praecipue quidem hoc argumento, quod ejus judicio, intellectus naturaliter magis est sui juris quam voluntas; quoniam voluntas intellectus ductum sequitur, ac ejus veluti gubernationi subjecta est, qua de causa a Graecis appellatur τὸ ἡγεμονικόν. Absurdum autem putat, in ea potius facultate libertatem esse formaliter, quae alieno imperio subest, quam in ea quae nullius alius facultatis legibus obstricta tenetur.