Rome commonly rejects this: freedom formally in the will alone; free choice the will itself under an aspect
The Roman School, however, generally rejects this view. Most of its teachers hold that the intellect is not free formally, and that freedom belongs in its own right and formally to the will alone.
So they teach that free choice is no power other than the will. It is simply the will, regarded in a certain respect and manner. The will and free choice are thus one and the same power in reality, yet free choice is distinguished from the will by a distinction of reason.
Latin
VII. Verum haec sententia communiter in Schola Romana rejicitur. Nam plerique illius Doctores existimant intellectum non esse formaliter liberum, sed libertatem esse per se & formaliter in sola voluntate. Ac proinde docent liberum arbitrium non esse potentiam a voluntate diversam, nec aliud quam ipsam voluntatem, certo tamen respectu & modo consideratam: ita ut quamvis voluntas & liberum arbitrium sint potentia reapse eadem, nihilominus Liberum Arbitrium a voluntate sit ratione distinctum.