The will reaches wider than free choice, in objects and in acts; the last end is willed naturally
In their view the will covers more ground than free choice, both in its objects and in its acts. Everything done by free choice is also done by the will, but the reverse does not hold.
Likewise every object of free choice is an object of the will, but not every object of the will falls to free choice. The highest end, happiness, is an object of the will, whereas free choice has for its object only the means to that end.
It follows that the acts by which we want to be happy and do not want to be wretched are acts of the will and not of free choice, since the will moves toward the last end by nature and not freely.
Latin
VIII. Etenim ex eorum mente voluntas latius patet quam liberum Arbitrium & quoad objecta, & quoad actiones. Nam quaecunque fiunt a libero arbitrio eadem quoque a voluntate fiunt, sed non contra. Et quicquid objectum est Liberi Arbitrii objectum est quoque voluntatis, sed non quicquid est objectum voluntatis est etiam liberi arbitrii objectum. Quippe finis summus, id est, beatitudo est objectum voluntatis, sed non est objectum liberi arbitrii, ad cujus objectum pertinent tantum media ad finem. Unde fit ut illi actus, quibus volumus esse felices, & nolumus esse miseri, sint actiones voluntatis, sed non actiones liberi arbitrii: quia voluntas in ultimum finem non fertur libere sed naturaliter.