The Molinists accept the second sense: the composed sense true of the prerequisites, false of the act
This sense is approved and accepted by those in the Roman School called Molinists. They deny that anything which prepares the human will for consent and moves and drives it beforehand, whether on God's side or on the intellect's, is incompatible with the will's dissent.
They hold that any judgment of reason and even any divine motion can be combined not only with the act toward which they move and direct the will in advance, but also with the absence of that act, and indeed with the contrary act. So the same motion of divine grace brings about conversion to God in one person and not in another, because the first chose of his own accord to follow grace's leading and the second did not.
In different respects, then, they both deny and affirm that the free agent, given all that is required for acting, can act and not act, do this and that, in the composed sense.
If it is taken to mean that in the free agent an act can be combined with ceasing from it, or one act with its opposite, they grant that this composed sense is false and only the divided sense opposed to it is true. But if someone holds that the absence of the act, or the opposite act, can be combined not with the act itself but with all that is required for acting, then in their view that composed sense is true.
Latin
XLVII. Atque hic sensus probatur & admittitur ab iis, qui in Schola Romana Molinistae dicuntur. Nec enim volunt quicquam esse eorum quae tam ex parte Dei, quam ex parte intellectus, voluntatem humanam ad consensum praeparant, & antecedenter movent atque impellunt, cum quo stare non possit voluntatis dissensus. Ac statuunt quodlibet rationis judicium, & quamlibet etiam divinam motionem, componi posse, non solum cum actu ad quem voluntatem praemovent & dirigunt, sed etiam cum actus illius carentia, imo cum actu contrario: adeo ut eadem gratiae divinae motio in uno conversionem ad Deum operetur, in alio vero non: propterea quod unus gratiae divinae ductum ultro sequi voluit, alter vero minime. Et ita diverso respectu & negant & affirmant, agens liberum positis omnibus ad agendum requisitis, posse, in sensu composito, agere & non agere, hoc & illud agere. Si quis enim intelligat in agente libero componi posse actum & cessationem ab actu, actum unum & ejus oppositum, fatentur sensum illum compositum falsum esse, & solum sensum divisum, qui illi opponitur, verum. Siquis vero pertendat non quidem cum actu ipso, sed tamen cum omnibus ad agendum requisitis, componi posse privationem actus, & actum oppositum, sensus ille compositus, juxta illos, verus est.