The recent Thomists deny both composed senses yet keep the power of not acting, as one sitting can walk
Those called the more recent Thomists think differently, for on their teaching both composed senses are false.
They hold that an act cannot be joined with its own absence or with the opposite act. Nor can the absence of the act, much less the contrary act, coexist with what is required beforehand for acting, among which is a certain divine premotion. Once what is required for an act is in place, the act follows certainly and infallibly, and it can never happen that it does not follow.
Yet they grant that, given all that is required for acting, the free agent can act and not act, do this and that. Though the absence or suspension of the act cannot stand with those prerequisites, the power of not acting, or of acting in the contrary way, fits with them perfectly well.
It is just as when the will actually consents: dissent cannot stand with that consent, but the power of dissenting remains. Again, the act of walking cannot go with the act of sitting, yet the power of walking does not conflict with it, and sitting does not remove that power from the one who sits.
In the same way the prerequisites for acting, whether on God's side or on the side of our intellect, carry the act along with them by necessary consequence, yet in no way remove the power of not acting. They do make the will act, but so that it acts while still able not to act, and without losing the power to act otherwise.
Latin
XLVIII. Verum aliter sentiunt qui dicuntur Thomistae recentiores. Nam juxta eorum doctrinam, uterque ille sensus compositus falsus est. Siquidem putant non solum cum actu jungi non posse ejus privationem, aut actum oppositum; sed ne quidem cum iis quae sunt ad agendum praerequisita, inter quae locum habet divina quaedam praemotio, consistere posse negationem actus, & multo minus actum contrarium. Idque quia positis quae praerequiruntur ad aliquem actum, actus ille sequitur certo & infallibiliter; nec unquam contingere potest ut non sequatur. Et tamen concedunt, positis omnibus ad agendum praerequisitis, agens liberum posse agere, atque non agere, hoc & illud agere: quia licet cum istis praerequisitis stare non possit actus negatio, vel suspensio actus; optime tamen cum iis consistit potestas non agendi, sive etiam contrarium agendi. Non secus ac cum actuali voluntatis consensu stare quidem nequit voluntatis dissensus, sed tamen manet ipsa dissentiendi potestas: Et cum actu sedendi compati non potest ambulandi actus, quamvis illi non repugnet potestas ambulandi, quae in sedente per actum sedendi non tollitur. Eo igitur modo praerequisita ad agendum, tum ex parte Dei, tum ex parte intellectus nostri, actum ipsum secum per consequentiam necessariam trahunt, & tamen potestatem non agendi minime tollunt. Quoniam efficiunt quidem ut voluntas agat, sed ita tamen agat, ut possit non agere, & aliter agendi potestatem non amittat.