Hence the contention is verbal: both agree on how the matter stands
[The 1675 print sets this thesis twice. The first setting joins the opening words below to a repeat of the second half of X, adding only 'tacitly or explicitly'; the full thesis follows.]
This shows, as I said, that the dispute here is about words, not substance. Both sides agree on how the matter actually stands: the will stands necessarily toward some acts and contingently toward others. Toward some it enjoys freedom of contrariety or contradiction, while toward others it is fixed on one course, that is, it cannot do the opposite or stop acting.
And yet in the acts it produces necessarily, the will is pleased with itself and supremely wills and approves its own acts.
Latin
[Print dittography, book 422-423: after X the compositor set 'XI. Unde patet, ut dixi, contentionem hic esse verbalem, non realem. Nempe utrique consentiunt quomodo res se in seipsa habeat. Nimirum voluntatem quorundam actuum respectu, habere se necessario; quamvis plerorumque aliorum respectu sese habeat contingenter. Ac praeterea quanquam existiment voluntatem liberam esse respectu tantum eorum actuum qui non necessario, sed contingenter ab ea eliciuntur, nihilominus agnoscunt in illis ipsis actibus ad quos voluntas immutabiliter & necessario determinata est, esse quandam voluntatis libentiam & complacentiam, quae in eo consistit quod dum voluntas in suum actum vel tacite, vel expresse reflectitur, illum probat & sibi imperat, quatenus, scilicet, non vult simpliciter, sed etiam vult se velle, & in proprio actu acquiescit.' and then set XI again in full, as follows.] XI. Unde patet, ut dixi, contentionem hic esse verbalem non realem. Nempe utrique consentiunt quomodo res se in seipsa habeat. Nimirum voluntatem quorundam actuum respectu, habere se necessario, aliorum vero respectu, contingenter. Illam respectu quorundam gaudere libertate contrarietatis, vel contradictionis: sed respectu aliorum esse ad unum determinatam, id est, non posse contrarium agere, vel ab agendo cessare. Et tamen in actibus illis quae necessario elicit voluntas, eam sibi complacere, & suos ipsius actus maxime velle & probare.