The only remaining question, whether necessary acts should be called free, concerns a name
Only one question remains: should the acts the will produces necessarily and inevitably, toward which it is entirely fixed on one course, be called free? Some say no. They hold that such acts are in no way free and should be called only voluntary, because the only freedom they recognize is that of contrariety or of contradiction.
Others grant that these acts are not free in the stricter sense of freedom, the sense in which we can will and refuse the same thing, or will something different or contrary, or at least will or not will, that is, stop willing. But they insist that the same acts can and should be called free in a broader sense, namely simple freedom, or freedom of complacency.
The question therefore comes down to this: does the simple complacency that belongs to the will in all its acts, necessary and contingent alike, deserve to be called freedom in some broader sense or not? Plainly that is a question about a name only.
Latin
XII. Quaestio solum remanet, An actus illi quos voluntas elicit necessario, & inevitabiliter, & respectu quorum prorsus ad unum determinata est, liberi dicendi sint? Negant alii, statuentes eos nullo modo liberos, sed voluntarios solum dicendos esse, quoniam nulla ab ipsis nominatur libertas, quae non sit contrarietatis, vel contradictionis. Alii vero concedunt actus illos liberos quidem non esse, libertate strictius dicta, per quam possumus idem velle & nolle, sive diversum aut contrarium velle, aut saltem velle & non velle, sive a volendo cessare: sed nihilominus pertendunt eosdem actus liberos dici posse & debere libertate latius sumpta, quae est libertas simplex, sive complacentiae. Ita ut quaestio ad istud reducatur; An simplex complacentia, quae voluntati competit respectu omnium suorum actuum, sive necessarii, sive contingentes sint, mereatur, vel non, libertas appellari latiori quadam significatione? quae quaestio ut apparet solum est de nomine.