Both agree: the act cannot be separated from God's motion, yet a power to cease or to the opposite remains
Both sides, then, agree on two points. A man whom the force and efficacy of God's grace or providence, together with his own reason's dictate, moves and drives to act must act, because his action cannot be separated from that motion of God and that determination of his own judgment.
And yet with such an act, and so with God's motion toward it, there coexists a power to stop it or even to do the opposite, in the way that has been explained and repeated more than once.
Latin
XXI. Utrique ergo in eo conveniunt, necesse esse ut agat ille quem ad agendum movet atque impellit divinae gratiae, vel providentiae vis & efficacia, & rationis propriae dictamen, quoniam ab illa motione Dei & judicii proprii determinatione actio hominis separari non potest: & tamen cum ejusmodi actu, adeoque cum motione Dei ad talem actum consistere potestatem ad cessationem ab illo, aut etiam ad actum oppositum, qua ratione saepius expositum & repetitum est.