They differ in words but agree in substance
So when one party says that a man whom God moves to a given act acts necessarily, and the other insists that no necessity in the proper sense drives him to act, their words differ but their meaning is the same.
The first party says such a man acts necessarily because his act cannot be separated from God's motion, and the second does not deny it. The second says he is bound to act by no necessity in the proper sense, because a power to the opposite act, or at least to leaving the act undone, sits perfectly well with the act itself and still more with the motion toward it, and the first party readily grants that.
Latin
XXII. Proinde quum isti quidem asserunt eum quem Deus movet ad actum hunc, aut illum necessario agere; alii vero pertendunt nulla proprie dicta necessitate illum ad agendum impelli, verbis quidem discrepant, idem autem reipsa sentiunt. Nempe priores dicunt ejusmodi hominem necessario agere, quia impossibile est actum ejus a divina motione sejungi, quod alii non negant. Juxta posteriores autem nulla proprie dicta necessitate ad agendum tenetur, quia cum ipso ejus actu, ac proinde multo magis cum motione ad actum, optime consistit potestas ad actum contrarium, vel saltem ad actus istius carentiam, quod priores facile concedent.