Ames (with Alvarez) and Twisse: predetermination leaves the power to act otherwise, in the divided sense
As for reconciling this predetermining concurrence with freedom of choice, on Ames's view one must say with Diego Alvarez that God's predetermination does not prevent the will from acting freely. It does make the will act certainly and infallibly, yet it does not take from the will the power to act otherwise.
Twisse likewise says that God moves human wills to do something in such a way that whatever happens comes about in keeping with the condition of their free will, so that at the very moment they act they are able not to act, in the divided sense, that is. 'In the composite sense it is utterly impossible.'
Latin
XLVI. Quod spectat autem conciliationem concursus istius praedeterminantis cum arbitrii libertate, ex mente Amesii dicendum est cum Didaco Alvares praedeterminationem Dei non impedire quominus Voluntas libere agat, quoniam efficit quidem ut Voluntas agat certo & infallibiliter, sed tamen ab ea non tollit potestatem aliter agendi. Et similiter Tuissus dicit, Deum ita movere voluntates hominum ad aliquid agendum, ut quicquid fit, liberae voluntatis ipsorum conditioni convenienter fiat: ita ut in ipso momento quo agunt, possint non agere, nempe in sensu diviso. Nam in sensu composito prorsus ἀδύνατον est.