Rutherford's two indifferences, objective and internal; all these theologians allow only hypothetical necessity
According to Rutherford, two kinds of indifference go to make up freedom. One is objective: the intellect puts before the will something it may choose, as a means that is not necessary to the highest good intended absolutely. The other is internal, vital and elective: by it the will of itself is able as much to will a thing as to refuse it, with both the essence of freedom and its own most natural way of acting kept intact.
God's predetermination prejudices neither kind of indifference in any way. Not the objective kind, since it does not prevent the intellect from setting before the will an object it may choose, one suited to reaching the end but not necessarily connected with it. Nor the internal kind, since when God determines the will to refuse this, he does not stand in the way of its being able by nature to will it.
Finally, all these theologians agree that God's premotion and predetermination does impose some necessity on the acts of the will, but only a hypothetical necessity. That does not conflict with freedom, which is overturned only by necessity arising from external force or from natural determination.
Latin
XLVII. Juxta Retorfortem vero ad libertatem duplex indifferentia concurrit, una objectiva, quando intellectus proponit aliquod eligibile voluntati, ut medium summo bono absolute intento non necessarium: alia interna, vitalis, electiva, qua voluntas ex se potest tam hoc velle, quam nolle, salva tum essentia libertatis, tum salvo naturalissimo agendi modo suo. Neutri autem indifferentiae Dei praedeterminatio ullatenus praejudicat. Non objectivae, quoniam non impedit quominus intellectus objectum eligibile voluntati proponat, ut idoneum quidem ad finem consequendum, sed tamen non habens cum eo connexionem necessariam. Non etiam internae, quoniam Deus determinans voluntatem ad hoc nolendum, non obstat quominus possit per naturam illud velle. Denique omnes illi Theologi in hoc conveniunt, ex Dei praemotione & praedeterminatione imponi quidem aliquam necessitatem actibus voluntatis, sed necessitatem tantum hypotheticam, quae non pugnat cum libertate, quam evertit sola necessitas a vi externa, aut a naturali determinatione orta.