The decree on which futurity depends is not a predetermining one, but only a decree to supply concurrence
They do not think that free causes, in order to act in time, must be premoved and predetermined by God to this or that act. In the same way, they do not think the decree of God on which the futurity of free acts depends, whether absolute or conditional, is a decree to premove and predetermine free causes.
Rather, they hold that without any such decree, whether simply laid down or at least supposed, God foreknows with certainty whatever free agents will do, absolutely or under a condition. For a thing to exist and be foreseen as future, they say, it is enough that we posit or suppose in God a decree to supply concurrence. They hold that concurrence alone is necessary for acting. As they conceive it, it is always available to free agents and neither applies them to act nor predetermines them.
Latin
VII. Caeterum quemadmodum ad hoc, ut in tempore agant causae liberae, non putant necessarium esse, ut a Deo praemoveantur, & praedeterminentur ad hunc aut illum actum: ita quoque Dei decretum unde pendet sive absoluta, seu conditionata futuritio actuum liberorum, non putant esse decretum aliquod causas liberas praemovendi, & praedeterminandi; sed absque tali decreto, vel simpliciter posito, vel saltem supposito, Deum certo praenosse quicquid factura sunt agentia libera vel absolute, vel sub conditione. Nempe ad hoc, ut res fit & praevideatur futura, sufficere si ponamus, vel supponamus in Deo decretum de subministrando concursu, quem solum putant ad agendum necessarium, & qui talis est ex eorum mente, ut semper praesto sit liberis agentibus, nec illa ad agendum vel applicet, vel praedeterminet.