Evil acts too are predefined as to their positive reality; their malice only permitted (Alvarez)
These authors do not exempt even the will's evil acts from this eternal predetermination of God. They hold that these too were predefined by an absolute and efficacious decree, at least as to what is real and positive in them. The malice itself, which is nothing but the privation of due rightness, they admit God did not efficaciously decree but only permitted.
This is seen especially in Diego Alvarez, in the summary on the helps of grace already cited, book 2, chapter 9, which begins: 'What has been said about the predetermination of the will to good acts must be extended to the act of sin insofar as it is an act and a being.
Hence whatever entity is found in any act of sin, even if that act is otherwise intrinsically evil, must be traced back to God as the first cause, who premoves and predetermines the created will to such an act insofar as it is an act and insofar as it is a being.'
Latin
VII. Nec ab hac aeterna Dei praedeterminatione excipiunt authores illi malos ipsos voluntatis actus, quos etiam absoluto & efficaci decreto praedefinitos esse volunt, saltem quantum ad illud quod in istis actibus est reale atque positivum; malitiam enim ipsam, quae non aliud est quam debitae rectitudinis privatio, non efficaciter a Deo decretam, sed solum permissam esse confitentur. Istud praesertim videre est apud Didacum Alvares in citata jam summa de auxiliis libro secundo capite nono, cujus hoc est initium, Quae dicta sunt de praedeterminatione voluntatis ad actus bonos, extendi debent ad actum peccati in quantum actus & ens est. Unde quicquid entitatis reperitur in quocunque actu peccati, etiamsi alias sit intrinsece malus, debet reduci in Deum tanquam in primam causam praemoventem & praedeterminantem voluntatem creatam ad talem actum, in quantum actus est, & secundum quod est ens.