Predetermined acts are necessary only by necessity of inference, and the decree itself infers the exercise of freedom
Lastly, someone may say that necessity is opposed to freedom; and if God by an efficacious will predetermines us to act, every one of our actions will be necessary, since whatever God wills to happen must happen. Alvarez answers that all acts God has predetermined do come about necessarily, but by necessity of inference, given the supposition of that decree.
They do not come about by absolute necessity, which overturns freedom. In fact, the same predetermination implies the actual exercise of our freedom. For God predetermined not only that the will should will such an object, but also predefined that it should will it freely.
Latin
XVII. Denique si quis dicat necessitatem opponi libertati: sed si Deus efficaci voluntate nos praedeterminat ad operandum, quamlibet operationem nostram fore necessariam, quoniam necesse est ut si Deus velit aliquid fieri, illud fiat: Respondet, actus omnes praedeterminatos a Deo necessario evenire necessitate Illationis, & ex suppositione ejusdem decreti, non tamen necessitate absoluta, quae libertatem evertit; imo ex eadem praedeterminatione inferri actuale exercitium nostrae libertatis. Quia Deus non solum praedeterminavit, ut voluntas velit tale objectum, sed etiam praedefinivit, ut libere illud velit.