Objection: a supposition outside the will's power makes the act simply necessary; answer: not when the supposition is on God's side
Someone may press further that the necessity introduced by the divine decree removes the freedom of the created will. What is necessary on a supposition becomes simply necessary for a given agent when it is not in his power to remove or establish the supposition from which the act, called necessary on that supposition, follows necessarily.
But it is not in the created will's power to remove or establish the supposition of God's efficacious decree predetermining created free choice to act. That decree comes from God alone and in no way depends on the free working of our choice, not even as foreknown by middle knowledge. So the will's acts that are called necessary on the supposition of that decree are necessary absolutely and simply, and therefore not free.
Alvarez answers that when the supposition preceding an act lies on the side of the first and most universal cause, namely God, something can be necessary on a supposition with respect to the created will and yet free for it without qualification. This holds even though it is not in the will's power to establish or remove the supposition from which the act necessarily follows by the necessity of infallibility.
It is otherwise, he says, when the preceding supposition lies on the side of some created cause external to the will. Only God, the author of the created will, can by his infinity and omnipotence change it in keeping with its nature, move it efficaciously, and apply it to produce a particular act, not only as to its substance but also as to its free mode. A created cause cannot do this, because it is limited, finite and lower than the will itself.
Latin
XVIII. Rursus si aliquis instet, necessitatem illam quam inducit decretum divinum tollere libertatem voluntatis creatae, quoniam illud quod est necessarium ex suppositione, efficitur necessarium simpliciter respectu alicujus, quando non est in ejus potestate tollere, vel ponere suppositionem illam, ad quam necessario sequitur actus, qui dicitur ex suppositione necessarius. Sed non est in potestate voluntatis creatae tollere, vel ponere suppositionem illam efficacis decreti voluntatis Dei praedeterminantis liberum arbitrium creatum ad operandum, cum illud decretum sit a solo Deo, & nullo modo dependeat ex libera operatione nostri arbitrii, etiam praecognita per scientiam mediam: ac proinde actus voluntatis qui dicuntur necessarii ex suppositione ejusdem decreti Divini, absolute & simpliciter sunt necessarii, & ita non liberi: Respondet. Quando suppositio antecedens aliquem actum tenet se ex parte primae & universalissimae causae, scilicet Dei, posse aliquid esse necessarium ex suppositione, respectu creatae voluntatis, & tamen liberum illi simpliciter: quamvis non sit in potestate illius ponere, vel tollere suppositionem, ex qua necessario necessitate infallibilitatis istud consequitur. Secus autem contingere, quando suppositio antecedens tenet se ex parte alicujus causae creatae, quae sit voluntati extrinseca. Idque quoniam solus Deus, qui est autor voluntatis creatae, propter suam infinitatem & omnipotentiam, potest illam immutare conformiter ad suam naturam, & movere efficaciter, atque applicare ad producendum actum in particulari, non solum secundum substantiam, sed etiam secundum modum libertatis; quod tamen non potest aliqua causa creata, quia est limitata, & finita, atque inferior ad ipsam voluntatem.