Baron's four steps in God's decree about the first sin
So he thinks the order of God's decree about that first sin can be explained as follows. 'First,' he says, 'God has a conditional foreknowledge by which he foresees that Adam will desire the fruit if such an occasion is offered him. He also has a foreknowledge by which he knew that he could direct that act of Adam to his own glory.
Second, he foresaw that from the wicked act Adam would perform if such an occasion were offered him, he could bring a great good, namely the display of his glory. Because of this, I say, he willed that the occasion be offered to Adam; that is, he willed to permit Eve, deceived by the serpent, to tempt Adam.
Third, by a foreknowledge that is not conditional but absolute, he foresaw that Adam's will would lean toward desiring the fruit at the time when Adam was to be tempted.
Fourth, partly so as not to take from Adam the use of his free choice, and partly to display his glory, he decreed to concur with Adam's will in producing that volition.
From this it plainly follows that Adam was not going to fall, or to desire the fruit, because God decreed to concur with his will in producing the desire. On the contrary, God decreed to concur in producing that action rather than another because he foresaw that Adam's will would lean that way when such an occasion was offered him.'
Latin
V. Sic ergo explicari posse putat ordinem Decreti Divini circa primum illud peccatum. Primo, inquit, Deus habet praescientiam conditionatam qua praevidet Adamum appetiturum pomum si offeratur illi talis occasio; habet item praescientiam, qua novit se posse illam actionem Adami dirigere ad gloriam suam. Secundo, quia praevidit se posse ex illa prava actione Adami, quam Adamus habiturus esset, si ei offeratur talis occasio; quia, inquam, praevidit se posse ex illa actione magnum bonum elicere, scilicet, manifestationem gloriae suae, ideo voluit illam occasionem Adamo offerri, id est, voluit permittere Evam a Serpente seductam Adamum tentare. Tertio, secundum praescientiam non conditionatam, sed absolutam praevidit voluntatem Adami inclinaturam esse ad appetitionem pomi, eo scilicet tempore quo Adamus tentandus esset. Quarto, partim ne praeriperet Adamo usum sui liberi Arbitrii, partim ut gloriam suam manifestaret, decrevit concurrere cum voluntate Adami ad eliciendam illam volitionem. Unde evidenter patet non ideo Adamum fuisse lapsurum, vel appetiturum pomum, quia Deus decrevit cum ejus voluntate concurrere ad eliciendam appetitionem; sed contra, ideo Deum decrevisse concurrere ad eliciendam illam actionem potius quam aliam, quia praevidit voluntatem ejus in talem partem inclinaturam fuisse, cum talis occasio illi offerretur.