Hence, says Baron, the decrees impose no causal necessity, only necessity of consequence, no more than foreknowledge
From this, he goes on to say, it plainly follows that God by the decrees of his providence does not impose on us a necessity of willing this or that. Nor are God's decrees the causes why we produce this or that volition at this or that time.
So it does not follow from the infallibility of the divine decrees that all our free actions come about necessarily by a causal necessity. From that infallibility it follows only that our free actions come about necessarily by the necessity of consequence, which is neither causal nor motive.
Thus the decrees of God's providence will no more remove the freedom of our choice and the contingency of our actions than God's foreknowledge does. A thing will not come about because it is foreknown; likewise we shall not act in these or those ways because God decreed to concur with us in producing these or those actions. Rather, God decreed to concur in such actions because he foresaw that we would act so.
Latin
VI. Ex quibus postea dicit manifeste sequi Deum per decreta Providentiae suae non imponere nobis necessitatem hoc vel illud volendi: ac praeterea Dei decreta non esse causas cur hoc vel illo tempore, hanc vel illam volitionem eliciamus; & per consequens ex infallibilitate decretorum divinorum non sequi omnes actiones nostras liberas evenire necessario necessitate causali: quia tantum ex illa infallibilitate decretorum sequitur actiones nostras liberas evenire necessario ea necessitate consequentiae, quae non est causalis vel motiva. Atque adeo decreta Providentiae Dei non magis tollent libertatem arbitrii nostri, & contingentiam nostrarum actionum, quam praescientia Dei: sicut enim res non ideo eventura est, quia praescita est, ita etiam nos non ideo acturi sumus, secundum has vel illas actiones, quia Deus decrevit nobiscum concurrere ad has vel illas actiones eliciendas: sed potius Deus decrevit concurrere ad tales actiones, quia praevidit nos ita acturos.