Against the last view: God cannot be said to will what he does not approve; willing evil's existence is incoherent
Finally, in the last opinion, though it is held by many illustrious doctors, we cannot accept their saying that God wills evils to be done, even though he does not bring them about but only permits them. We do not think God can rightly be said to will what he does not approve, and it cannot be said that evils are done with God's approval.
Nor can we see the sense of the distinction they draw between evil and the outcome of evil, when they say that God does not will evil yet does will the outcome of evil; that God refuses evils themselves yet wills that evils should happen; or, what amounts to the same, that he wills the existence of evils.
How can the existence of a thing be distinguished from the thing itself? And how can anyone refuse something and at the same time will that it exist?
Latin
XLI. Denique in postrema, plurium tamen Doctorum illustrium, sententia probare non possumus, quod dicunt Deum velle ut mala fiant, licet ipso non efficiente, sed tantum permittente. Nec enim putamus Deum recte dici posse velle id quod non probat. At dici non potest mala fieri Deo approbante. Nec percipimus sensum distinctionis illius, qua distinguunt inter malum & inter mali eventum, & aiunt Deum malum quidem non velle, sed nihilominus velle mali eventum; Deumque mala ipsa nolle, sed tamen velle ut mala contingant; seu quod idem est, velle malorum existentiam quomodo potest enim existentia rei a re ipsa distingui, & qua ratione potest aliquis rem quampiam nolle, & simul velle ut res illa existat?