Bellarmine's state of the question: free choice with the necessary help supposed
Bellarmine himself explains the sense of this question as follows. 'We are not disputing here,' he says, 'whether the law can be fulfilled by the strength of nature alone. Nor are we unaware that the help of grace is in every way necessary, since the law alone does not make men righteous; rather, those justified through grace do the law.
Our question is whether, once the help of grace is supposed, man truly has free choice, so that he can fulfil the law or, if he prefers, transgress it. Just as, if someone asks whether a man can see or not see at will, one should not object, "What if there is no light?", for the question is understood with everything supposed that is necessarily required.
We say, then, that once the necessary help is supposed, whatever it may be, man is truly and properly free in moral matters.' On grace and free choice, book 5, chapter 18.
Latin
LIII. Sic quaestionis hujus sensum exponit ipse Bellarminus, Non enim, inquit, disputamus hoc loco, possitne lex solis naturae viribus adimpleri, nec ignoramus auxilium gratiae esse modis omnibus necessarium, cum lex sola non faciat justos, sed contra potius per gratiam justificati faciant legem. Sed quaestio nostra est, utrum posito auxilio gratiae, homo sit vere liberi arbitrii, ita ut possit legem implere, vel eandem, si maluerit, praevaricari. Quomodo si quis quaerat, An possit homo pro arbitrio videre, & non videre; non oportet objicere, quid si lumen absit? intelligitur enim quaestio positis omnibus quae necessario requiruntur. Nos igitur dicimus, posito auxilio necessario, quodcunque illud sit, hominem vere proprieque liberum esse in moralibus. De Gratia & libero arbitrio libro quinto cap. 18.