Does God govern even sin?
In view of the many things we have said earlier about Jesus, there is no need now to repeat ourselves in answer to this: “So then they themselves are clearly convicted of worshipping not a god, nor even a demon, but a corpse.” Passing this over at once for that reason, let us look at Celsus’s next words, in which he says: “But first I will ask: why should demons not be served? Are not all things governed according to the will of God, and is not all providence from him? And whatever there is in the universe, whether the work of God, or of angels, or of other demons, or of heroes, do not all these things have a law from the greatest God? And has not whoever was deemed worthy been appointed over each thing, having received a power by lot? Shall not, then, the one who worships God rightly serve this being, who has obtained his authority from that source?” “For it is not possible,” he says, “for the same man to serve many masters” (Matthew 6:24; Luke 16:13).
Notice, then, how much he takes for granted even in these words, matters that need no slight examination, and knowledge as well of deeper and more secret truths about the government of the whole universe. For we must examine in what sense it is said that all things are governed according to the will of God, and whether this governing extends to sins as well, or not. If the governing extends to sins as well, not only among men but also among demons and any other being outside the body whose nature can sin, let the one who says this see how absurd it is to say that all things are governed according to the will of God. For it follows from the argument that sins too, and all that comes from wickedness, are governed according to the will of God; and this is not the same as saying that they happen while God does not prevent them. And if someone takes “being governed” in its proper sense, he is saying that the things that come from wickedness are governed (since, of course, all things are governed according to the will of God); and then no one who sins transgresses against God’s government.
The same distinction must be drawn about providence. We must say that “all providence is from him” means something true when the providence is good. But if we say, without qualification, that everything that happens is according to providence, even when something happens wickedly, then “all providence is from him” will be false; unless perhaps someone were to say that what follows as a consequence of what comes from God’s providence is also from God’s providence.
He also declares that “whatever there is in the universe, whether the work of God, or of angels, or of other demons, or of heroes, all these things have a law from the greatest God”; and what he declares is not true. For those who transgress do not transgress while following the law that comes from the greatest God. And reason shows that not only wicked men transgress, but also the wicked demons and the wicked angels.
Greek
Διὰ δὲ τὰ ἀνωτέρω πολλὰ περὶ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἡμῖν εἰρημένα οὐ χρὴ νῦν παλιλλογεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὅτι μὲν οὖν αὐτοὶ διελέγχονται σαφῶς οὐ θεὸν ἀλλ᾿ οὐδὲ δαίμονα, ἀλλὰ νεκρὸν σέβοντες. τοῦτο μὲν αὐτίκα διὰ τοῦτο παραλιπόντες ἴδωμεν τὰς ἑξῆς τοῦ Κέλσου λέξεις, ἐν αἷς φησι· πρότερον δὲ ἐρήσομαι. διὰ τί δαίμονας οὐ θεραπευτέον; οὐ πάντα μέντοι κατὰ γνώμην διοικεῖται τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ πᾶσα ἐξ ἐκείνου πρόνοια; καὶ ὅ τι περ ἂν (ᾖ) ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις, εἴτε θεοῦ ἔργον εἴτ᾿ ἀγγέλων εἴτ᾿ ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἴτε ἡρώων, πάντα ταῦτα ἔχει νόμον ἐκ τοῦ μεγίστου θεοῦ, τέτακται δὲ ἐφ᾿ ἑκάστῳ δύναμιν λαχὼν ὅστις ἠξίωται; τοῦτον οὖν τὸν ἐκεῖθεν ἐξουσίας τετυχηκότα οὐ θεραπεύσει δικαίως ὁ σέβων τὸν θεόν; οὔτε γὰρ οἷόν τε, φησὶ, „δουλεύειν“ τὸν αὐτὸν πλείοσι „κυρίοις.“ ὅρα δὴ καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὅσα συναρπάζει, δεόμενα οὐκ εὐκαταφρονήτου ἐξετάσεως ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιστήμης βαθυτέρων καὶ ἀποῤῥητοτέρων περὶ τῆς τῶν ὅλων πραγμάτων διοικήσεως. τὸ γὰρ πάντα κατὰ γνώμην διοικεῖσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ πῶς λέγεται, ἐξεταστέον, καὶ πότερον τὸ διοικεῖσθαι φθάνει καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἁμαρτανόμενα ἢ μή. εἰ μὲν γὰρ φθάνει τὸ διοικεῖσθαι καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἁμαρτανόμενα οὐ μόνον ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἀλλὰ καὶ δαίμοσι καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τῶν ἔξω σωμάτων πέφυκεν ἁμαρτάνειν, ὁράτω τὴν ἀτοπίαν ὁ τοῦτο λέγων τοῦ πάντα κατὰ γνώμην διοικεῖσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ· ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὰ ἁμαρτανόμενα καὶ πάντα τὰ ἀπὸ κακίας κατὰ γνώμην διοικεῖσθαι τοῦ θεοῦ, ὅπερ οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστι τῷ οὐ κωλύοντος τοῦ θεοῦ γίνεται· εἰ δὲ καὶ κυρίως τις ἀκούοι τοῦ διοικεῖσθαι, διοικεῖσθαι μὲν λέγει τὰ ἀπὸ κακίας διοικούμενα (δηλονότι πάντα κατὰ γνώμην διοικεῖται τοῦ θεοῦ), καὶ οὐ παρανομεῖ εἰς τὴν διοίκησιν τοῦ θεοῦ πᾶς ἁμαρτάνων. τὸ δ᾿ ὅμοιον καὶ περὶ προνοίας διασταλτέον καὶ λεκτέον ὅτι τὸ πᾶσα ἐξ ἐκείνου πρόνοια σημαίνει μέν τι ἀληθὲς, ὅτε ἡ πρόνοια σπουδαῖόν ἐστιν· εἰ δ᾿ ἁπαξαπλῶς πάντα τὰ γινόμενα (κατὰ) πρόνοιαν εἶναι φήσομεν, κἂν κακῶς τι γίνηται, ψεῦδος ἔσται τὸ πᾶσα ἐξ ἐκείνου πρόνοια· εἰ μὴ ἄρα καὶ τὰ κατ᾿ ἐπακολούθησιν τῶν ἐκ προνοίας θεοῦ λέγοι τις εἶναι ἐκ προνοίας θεοῦ. ἀποφαίνεται δὲ καὶ ὅ τι περ ἂν ᾖ ἐν τοῖς ολοις, εἴτε θεοῦ ἔργον εἴτ᾿ ἀγγέλων εἴτε ἄλλων δαιμόνων εἴτε ἡρώων, πάντα ταῦτα ἔχει νόμον ἐκ τοῦ μεγίστου θεοῦ, καὶ οὐκ ἀληθῆ γε λόγον ἀποφαίνεται. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὰ παρανομοῦντα ἑπόμενα νόμῳ τῷ ἀπὸ μεγίστου θεοῦ παρανομεῖ. παρανομεῖν δὲ ὁ λόγος δείκνυσιν οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώπους φαύλους ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς φαύλους δαίμονας καὶ τοὺς φαύλους ἀγγέλους.