On the Imputation of Adam's First Sin · §330 · Josué de la Place (Placeus)

Chapter 6: generative faculty not moral

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I scarcely trusted my eyes when I read that the generative faculty could have a place among the moral faculties: Will moral philosophy also snatch it hereafter from the physicists and physicians as from possessors of bad faith, and claim it as her own peculiar? What has that faculty, that it ought rather to be raised to the dignity of morals than the concoctive, or nutritive, or augmentative, which philosophers have hitherto taught are not partakers of reason, but by their nature brute and unaware of themselves, and which belong to man not as he is man, but as he has a nature common with other animals? Finally, what law of the Decalogue is there to whose precept the faculty of generating is to be believed subject? For all, I hope, agree that morals are bounded by the Decalogue. But at least it is subject to morals. Nay, not even that is simply true; otherwise it would always be moved by the empire of the will, which it is certain often happens otherwise. Nor does a woman always either conceive when she wills, or not conceive when she does not will.

Latin

GAR. Ego vero vix oculis meis credidi cum legerem facultatem genitricem inter facultates morales locum habere posse: An etiam ut eam physicis & medicis tanquam male fidei possessoribus ereptam, moralis philosophia in posterum sibi tanquam proprium peculium vindicet? Quid vero habet facultas ista, quare potius ad moralium dignitatem evehi debeat, quam concoctrix, vel altrix, vel augmentatrix, quas hactenus docuerunt Philosophi non esse rationis participes, sed natura sua brutas ac sui nescias, quaeque homini conveniant, non qua homo est, sed qua naturam habet cum aliis animalibus communem? Denique quae lex erit Decalogi, cuius praecepto facultas generandi subjacere credenda sit? Moralia enim Decalogo circumscribi omnes, ut spero, consentiunt. At saltem moralibus subjecta est. Imo neque hoc simpliciter verum, alioqui ex imperio voluntatis semper moveretur, quod saepe aliter fieri certum. Neque foemina semper vel concipit, cum vult, vel non concipit, quando non vult.

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